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Abstract
Here, we study games of incomplete information and argue that it is important to correctly
specify the \context" within which hierarchies of beliefs lie. We consider a situation where
the players understand more than the analyst: It is transparent to the players|but not to
the analyst|that certain hierarchies of beliefs are precluded. In particular, the players' type
structure can be viewed as a strict subset of the analyst's type structure. How does this
aect a Bayesian equilibrium analysis? One natural conjecture is that this doesn't change
the analysis|i.e., every equilibrium of the players' type structure can be associated with an
equilibrium of the analyst's type structure. We show that this conjecture is wrong. Bayesian
equilibrium may fail an Extension Property. This can occur even in the case where the game is
nite and the analyst uses the so-called universal structure (to analyze the game)|and, even,
if the associated Bayesian game has an equilibrium. We go on to explore specic situations in
which the Extension Property is satised.
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This paper introduces a novel robustness question for the analysis of incomplete information
games. We focus on a situation where the analyst correctly species the exogenous parameters of
the game and the players' hierarchies of beliefs, but misspecies the context within which these
hierarchies lie. We ask: Are the analyst's predictions robust to misspecifying the context of the
game?
What is the Context of the Game? Suppose that Nature tosses a coin, whose realization
is either  or . The realization of this toss results in distinct payo functions. Each of two
players, resp. Izzy (i) and Joe (j), face uncertainty about the realization of this coin toss. What
choices should Izzy and Joe make here? Presumably, Izzy's choice will depend on her belief about
the realization of the coin toss. But, presumably, Izzy's choice will also depend on what she
thinks about Joe's belief about the realization of the coin toss. After all, Joe's belief (about the
realization of the coin toss) should inuence his action, too. And, Izzy is concerned not only with
what matrix is being played, but also with what choice Joe is making within the matrix.
To analyze the situation, we add to the description of the game, so that it also reects these
hierarchies of beliefs. In particular, we append a type structure to the game. One such type
structure is given in Figure 1.1. Here, there are two possible types of Izzy, viz. ti and ui, and one
possible type of Joe, viz. tj. Type ti (resp. ui) of Izzy assigns probability one to Nature choosing
 (resp. ) and Joe's type being tj. Type tj of Joe assigns probability 1
2 to \Nature choosing
 and Izzy being type ti" and probability 1
2 to \Nature choosing  and Izzy being type ui." So,
type tj of Joe assigns probability 1
2 to \Nature choosing  and Izzy assigning probability one to
" and probability 1
2 to \Nature choosing  and Izzy assigning probability one to ." And so on.
i() (;tj) (;tj)
ti 1 0
ui 0 1
j() (;ti) (;ti) (;ui) (;ui)
tj
1
2 0 0 1
2
Figure 1.1: Type Structure
This type structure describes a situation where there are only two possible hierarchies of beliefs
that Izzy can hold and only one possible hierarchy of beliefs that Joe can hold. In particular, it
does not induce all hierarchies of beliefs. What is the rationale for limiting the type structure in
this way? We view the specied game as only one part of the picture|a small piece of a larger
story. The game sits within a broader strategic situation. That is, there is a history to the game,
and this history inuences the players. As Brandenburger, Friedenberg and Keisler (2008, p. 319)
put it:
2We think of a particular ... structure as giving the \context" in which the game is
played. In line with Savage's Small-Worlds idea in decision theory, who the players are
in the given game can be seen as a shorthand for their experiences before the game.
The players' possible characteristics|including their possible types|then reect the
prior history or context.
Under this view, the type structure, taken as a whole, reects the context of the game. (Section
6a expands on this point and discusses the relationship to other views of game theory.)
Misspecifying the Context of the Game Consider the following scenario: The analyst
looks at the strategic situation and the history. Perhaps the analyst even deduces that certain
hierarchies are inconsistent with the history. But, to the players, it is transparent that other|
that is, even more|hierarchies are inconsistent with the history. Put dierently, players rule out
hierarchies the analyst hasn't ruled out.
i() (;tj) (;tj) (;uj) (;uj)
ti 1 0
ui 0 1
j() (;ti) (;ti) (;ui) (;ui)
tj
1
2 0 0 1
2
uj
Figure 1.2: The Analyst's Type Structure
Return to the earlier example and suppose the players' type structure is as given in Figure 1.1.
Suppose the analyst misspecies the type structure and instead studies the structure in Figure
1.2. But, it contains one extra type of Joe, viz. uj. Type uj is associated with some belief,
distinct from type tj's belief. The particular belief is immaterial. What is important is that
each of Izzy's types assigns zero probability to this type of Joe. More to the point, each of Izzy's
types is associated with the exact same beliefs as in the players' type structure. So, the players'
type structure can be viewed as a subset (or substructure) of the analyst's type structure.
How does this aect an analysis? Take the solution concept of Bayesian Equilibrium applied
to a Bayesian game associated with the type structure in Figure 1.2. For a given Bayesian
Equilibrium, the analyst will have a prediction associated with the type uj|i.e., a type that the
players have ruled out. But the analyst will also have a prediction for the types ti, ui, and tj.
These are types in the players' structure, namely Figure 1.1.
The question is: How does the analyst's predictions for these types relate to the predictions
he would have, if he had analyzed the game using the players' type structure? Presumably, the
analyst's predictions shouldn't change. After all, the beliefs associated with ti, ui, and tj have
not changed at all. So, we can associate any equilibrium of the players' actual type structure
with an equilibrium of the analyst's type structure, and vice versa.
3Implicit in the above is that Bayesian Equilibrium satises Extension and Pull-Back Proper-
ties: Fix a type structure, viz. T , associated with type sets Ti and Tj. We will think of T as
the players' type structure. Now, consider another type structure T , associated with type sets
T
i and T
j . Suppose there is a map hi : Ti ! T
i (resp. hj : Tj ! T
j ) so that each ti and hi(ti)
(resp. tj and hj(tj)) induce the same hierarchies of beliefs. We will think of T  as the analyst's
structure. Now, we can state the Extension and Pull-back Properties.
The Equilibrium Extension Problem (Preliminary Version). Fix an equilib-
rium of T . Does there exist an equilibrium of T  so that each hi(ti) 2 T
i and each
hj(tj) 2 T
j plays the same strategy as do ti and tj (under the original equilibrium of
T )?
The Equilibrium Pull-Back Problem (Preliminary Version). Fix an equilib-
rium of T . Does there exist an equilibrium of T so that each ti 2 Ti and each tj 2 Tj
plays the same strategy as do hi(ti) and hj(tj) (under the original equilibrium of T )?
Return to the question of whether the analyst can study the Bayesian game in Figure 1.2.
The answer is yes, provided that the analyst won't lose any predictions and won't introduce any
new predictions. The question of losing predictions is the Extension Problem. The question of
introducing new predictions is the Pull-Back Problem.
What is Already Known? While the robustness question is new to this paper, examples and
results in the literature appear to speak to the Extension and Pull-Back Problems|at least as
we have formalized these ideas, thus far. We begin with two examples.
Example 1.1. 1 Suppose Nature chooses the single parameter from  = fg. Type structures
T and T , in Figures 1.3-1.4, describe Izzy's and Joe's hierarchies of beliefs about . Observe
that these two type structures induce exactly the same set of hierarchies of beliefs about Nature's
choice from : In each type structure, each type of each player assigns probability 1 to . In each
each type structure, each type of each player assigns probability one to \the other player assigns
probability 1 to ." And so on.
i() (;tj) (;uj)
ti 1 0
ui 0 1
j() (;ti) (;ui)
tj 1 0
uj 0 1
Figure 1.3: Type Structure T
1We thank Pierpaolo Battigalli for suggesting this example.
4
i () (;t
j)
t
i 1

j() (;t
i)
t
j 1
Figure 1.4: Type Structure T 
Let Nature's choice of the parameter  result in the payo matrix in Figure 1.5. While the type
structures T and T  induce the same set of hierarchies of beliefs, we will see that the Bayesian
game associated with the type structure T has equilibrium predictions that cannot be induced
by the Bayesian game associated with the type structure T .
First focus on the Bayesian game associated with type structure T . The Bayesian equilibria
of this game correspond exactly to the Nash equilibria of the game in Figure 1.5, i.e., either types
t
i and t
j play (Up;Left), play (Down;Right), or assign 1
2 : 1
2 to Up : Down and Left : Right.
Joe
Left Right
Izzy
Up 1,1 0,0
Down 0,0 1,1
Figure 1.5
Next, focus on the Bayesian game associated with type structure T . There are Bayesian
equilibria where the types of both players coordinate on a Nash equilibrium of the game in Figure
1.5, e.g., where both ti;ui play Up and tj;uj play Left. But there is also a Bayesian equilibrium
where, say, (ti;tj) play (Up;Left) and (ui;uj) play (Down;Right).
Observe that this already points to a problem with the Equilibrium Extension Property, at
least as we have dened it. For instance, take T to be the players' type structure and T  to be the
analyst's type structure. Then there are mappings hi(ti) = hi(ui) = t
i and hj(tj) = hj(uj) = t
j
that preserve hierarchies of beliefs. Yet, there is an equilibrium of the players' type structure that
cannot be extended to an equilibrium of the analyst's type structure: The types ti and ui in the
players type structure are mapped to the same type t
i in the analyst's type structure. But, there
is some equilibrium where these types, i.e., ti and ui, choose dierent actions. 2
Example 1.2 (Battigalli and Siniscalchi, 2003; Ely and Peski, 2006; Dekel, Fudenberg and Morris,
2007; Liu, 2009). Suppose Nature chooses a parameter from  = f;g. This choice determines
the players' payo functions, as specied in Figure 1.6.
Type structures T and T , in Figures 1.7-1.8, describe Izzy's and Joe's hierarchies of beliefs
about . Observe that these two type structures induce exactly the same set of hierarchies of
beliefs about the parameter: In each type structure, each type of each player assigns 1
2 : 1
2 to  : .
So, in each type structure, each type of each player assigns probability one to \the other player
5Joe
 Left Right
Izzy
Up 5, 0 0, 0
Down 3, 0 3, 0
Joe
 Left Right
Izzy
Up 0, 0 5, 0
Down 3, 0 3, 0
Figure 1.6
assigns 1
2 : 1
2 to  : ." And so on.
i() (;tj) (;tj) (;uj) (;uj)
ti
1
2 0 0 1
2
j() (;ti) (;ti)
tj
1
2
1
2
uj
1
2
1
2
Figure 1.7: Type Structure T

i () (;t
j) (;t
j)
t
i
1
2
1
2

j() (;t
i) (;t
i)
t
j
1
2
1
2
Figure 1.8: Type Structure T 
While the type structures T and T  induce the same set of hierarchies of beliefs, the Bayesian
game associated with the type structure T has equilibrium predictions that cannot be induced by
the Bayesian game associated with the type structure T . In any equilibrium of Bayesian game
associated with T , t
i plays Down. But, there exists a Bayesian equilibrium associated with the
type structure T where ti plays Up, tj plays Left, and uj plays Right.
This example also points to a problem with the Equilibrium Extension and Pull-Back Prop-
erties, as we have dened them. For instance, take T to be the players' type structure and T 
to be the analyst's type structure. Then there are mappings hi(ti) = t
i and hj(tj) = hj(uj) = t
j
that preserve hierarchies of beliefs. Yet, there is an equilibrium of the players' type structure that
cannot be extended to an equilibrium of the analyst's type structure. Likewise, if we take T to be
the analyst' type structure and T  to be the player's type structure, then there is an equilibrium
of the analyst's type structure that cannot be pulled-back to an equilibrium of the players' type
structure. 2
Examples 1.1-1.2 illustrate failures of preliminary versions of the Extension and Pull-Back
Properties. But, they do not address the robustness question we are interested in. To see this,
begin with Example 1.1, where the true parameter  is common belief amongst the players. We
6described the players' type structure as T , where two types of Izzy (resp. Joe) induce the same
single hierarchy of beliefs about . These types specify information that is not available to the
players when the only set of ex ante uncertainty is about the parameter  = fg. They provide
additional information|not only about |but also about the realization of some external signal.
In eect, the name of these types, i.e., ti vs. ui (resp. tj vs. uj), species the information about the
realization of these external signals. Indeed, the new equilibrium of the Bayesian game (associated
with T ) can be obtained as an objective correlated equilibrium of the game matrix in Figure 1.5.
(See Aumann, 1987.)
A similar idea is at play in Example 1.2. There, the type structure T provides information
that is not available to Joe when the only set of ex ante uncertainty is hierarchies of beliefs about
the parameter . Two types of Joe, viz. tj and uj induce the same hierarchies of beliefs about
. The fact that Joe's action can vary with these types reects the idea that Joe has obtained
dierent information about the realization of some external signal.
In both examples, we have a type structure T , where two types of a player induce the same
hierarchies of beliefs about the parameter . This type structure is redundant. Redundant
structures can provide information above and beyond hierarchies of beliefs about the parameter
; they can also provide information about an external signal. (See Liu, 2009 for a formal
statement.)
We are interested in the case where the analyst correctly species the parameters of the game
(including the set of actual signals), correctly species players' hierarchies of beliefs about these
parameters, but simply also considers possible that players may have `additional hierarchies,' i.e.,
hierarchies ruled out by the players themselves. Examples 1.1-1.2 illustrate that, as stated, a
failure of the Extension or Pull-Back Property need not reect this robustness criterion|it may
instead reect a failure to correctly specify the parameter set (or signal space) in the game. Thus,
we will need to amend the statement of the Extension and Pull-Back Properties to reect our
robustness question. One simple way to do so is by restricting Extension and Pull-Back to non-
redundant type structures. Once we introduce the main formalism, we will see that we can, in
fact, state the Extension and Pull-Back Problems somewhat more generally.
Are the Extension and Pull-Back Problems Satised? We will see that the Pull-Back
Problem is indeed satised. This fact is `in the air' so to speak. Thus the focus of this paper
will be on the Extension Problem. It is easy to construct simple pathological examples where the
Extension Property fails:
Example 1.3. Suppose Nature chooses a parameter from  = f;g. In either case, players'
actions are 0;1;2;3;:::. If the true parameter is , then Izzy (resp. Joe) obtains a payo of 1 if
she (resp. he) chooses 0 and obtains a payo of 0 otherwise. If the true parameter is , then Izzy
(resp. Joe) obtains a payo of 100 if she (resp. he) chooses an action strictly higher than Joe's
(resp. Izzy's) action; otherwise, she (resp. he) obtains a payo of 0.
7i() (;tj) (;tj)
ti 0 1
j() (;ti) (;ti)
tj 0 1
Figure 1.9: Players' Type Structure T
Take the player's type structure to be T described in Figure 1.9. Here, there is a unique
Bayesian equilibrium where the single type Izzy and Joe both play the action 0. Now, take the
analyst's type structure to be T  as in Figure 1.10. This adds a type for each player. This new
Bayesian game does not have a equilibrium. Thus, we cannot extend a Bayesian equilibrium from
the players' structure to a Bayesian equilibrium from the analyst's type structure. 2

i () (;t
j) (;t
j) (;u
j) (;u
j)
t
i 0 1 0 0
u
i 0 :1 :9 0

j() (;t
i) (;t
i) (;u
i) (;u
i)
t
j 0 1 0 0
u
j 0 :1 :9 0
Figure 1.10: Type Structure T 
Example 1.3 illustrates that we may have a failure of the Equilibrium Extension Property.
The reason for this failure is that the game of incomplete information is itself pathological. As a
consequence, we have a situation where there is no Bayesian equilibrium of the analyst's game.
But the failure of Equilibrium Extension need not be an artifact of such pathologies. We
will build an example of an Extension Failure from, arguably, \standard" ingredients|that is,
ingredients which are well-understood and for which we would very much expect no problem to
arise. Let us point to some features of the construction:
 The parameter set  is nite.
 The game   has a nite number of players and each player has a nite number of choices.
 For any associated type structure, there is an equilibrium of the associated Bayesian game.
So, in particular, there will be an equilibrium of the analyst's Bayesian game.
 The players' type structure T has (at most) a countable number of types. There are no
further restrictions on the structure|so, for instance, we can take it to arise from a common
prior.
 The analyst's type structure T  is the canonical construction of the universal type structure
based on the (nite) parameter set .
8So we have a nite parameter set, a nite game, a nite or countable players' type structure, a
universal analyst's structure, and existence in the analyst's Bayesian game|standard ingredients.
Along the way, we will construct an example of a second extension failure|one that satises
the above requirements with one notable exception: it need not be the case that, for any type
structure, there is an equilibrium of the associated Bayesian game. In particular, in this second
construction, there will not be an equilibrium of the analyst's universal Bayesian game.2 This
alternate construction also implies a failure of Equilibrium Extension. But, it is not built from
\standard" ingredients. In our main example, we have a failure of Extension, despite the fact that
the players' Bayesian game and the analyst's universal Bayesian game both have an equilibrium.
Indeed, precisely because the analyst's universal Bayesian game does have an equilibrium, the
analyst may be misled into thinking that he has captured all possible predictions, when he has
not. By contrast, if there is no equilibrium of the analyst's structure, he will presumably not be
misled in this way.
The case of a universal type structure is of particular interest. It is often presumed that the
analyst should necessarily take the universal structure to applications, even if the current state of
applied work does not do so. See, e.g., Morris and Shin (2003) who say \optimal strategic behavior
should be analyzed in the space of all possible innite hierarchies of beliefs." The Extension failure
tells us that|while perhaps appealing|such an general principle may, in fact, be problematic.
Positive Results The negative results raise the question: Are there situations in which the
analyst can be guaranteed that his analysis will not fail the Extension property? We provide two
sets of conditions under which the answer is yes. First, we can extend any universally measurable
equilibrium in compact continuous games, provided there are (at most) a countable number of
types that are in the analyst's structure but not the players' structure. (See Denition 2.9 for
the concept of universal measurability.) Second, we have an Extension property if the analyst's
structure satises a common prior plus a positivity requirement. See Sections 5.1-5.2.
Going Forward These positive results get at|but do not answer|an important question. To
what extent do the Bayesian games studied in applications satisfy or fail Extension? The positive
results tell us that, for certain applications, we do indeed satisfy Extension. But, they do not
cover all applications. At the theoretical level, addressing this question requires answering a
more fundamental question: Can we characterize the set of Bayesian games that satisfy or fail
Extension? We don't know the answer and leave this as an open question.
Absent such a characterization, how can the analyst proceed (when the sucient conditions
do not obtain)? One idea is to modify the Bayesian equilibrium concept and use, instead, what
Sadzik (2011) calls, Local Bayesian Equilibrium (LBE). Under an LBE analysis, the analyst does
not stop at characterizing the set of Bayesian equilibria for a given Bayesian game. Instead, the
2This construction uses an important result due to Hellman (2014). However, it is not a Corollary of Hellman.
It also makes use of Lemma 2.2 and the Pull-Back Property below. To the best of our knowledge, this is the rst
example of a nite game so that the associated universal Bayesian game does not have any Bayesian equilibrium.
9analyst looks across all sub-Bayesian games and characterizes all equilibria across this class. In
eect, LBE requires that the analyst analyze every possible players' type structure.
Sadzik (2011) introduced the LBE concept to `get around' a dierent robustness question:
robustness to misspecifying external signals. (Refer back to the discussion on pages 6-7.) One
might have thought that, when the analyst can correctly specify the parameters of the game
(including the set of external signals) but is uncertain of the context, studying the LBE concept|
as opposed to the Bayesian equilibrium concept|is `overkill.' However, our negative result shows
that this is not the case: Even if the game of incomplete information is nite and there exists
an equilibrium of every associated Bayesian game, using Bayesian equilibrium to analyze the
universal type structure may be insucient to capture predictions associated with every players'
type structure.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 sets up preliminaries. The Extension and Pull-Back
Properties are formally dened in Section 3. There, we also show the Pull-Back result. Section
4 shows the negative results. Sections 5.1-5.2 provide positive results|conditions on the game
and on the type structure which guarantee the Extension property. Finally, Section 6 concludes
by discussing some conceptual and formal aspects of the paper.
2 Bayesian Games
Throughout the paper, we adopt the following conventions. We will endow the product of topo-
logical spaces with the product topology, and a subset of a topological space with the induced
topology. Given a metrizable space 
, endow 
 with the Borel sigma-algebra B(
) unless other-
wise stated. In this case, write (
) for the set of probability measures on 
 and endow (
)
with the topology of weak convergence. If 
 is Polish, so is (
). Given some  2 (
), write
B(
;) for the completion of the Borel sigma-algebra with respect to .
Given a nite index set I, write 
 =
Q
i2I 
i, 
 i =
Q
j2Infig 
j, and 
 i j =
Q
k2Infi;jg 
k.
Write ! (resp. ! i) for a typical element of 
 (resp. 
 i). Given maps fi : 
i ! i, for each
i 2 I, write f for the product map from 
 to , given by f(!1;:::;!jIj) = (f1(!1);:::;fjIj(!jIj)).
Dene f i analogously.
Fix measure spaces (
1;S(
1)) and (
2;S(
2)), where S(
1) and S(
2) are arbitrary sigma-
algebras on 
1 and 
2. A function f : 
1 ! 
2 is (S(
1);S(
2))-measurable if, for each E2 2
S(
2), f 1(E2) 2 S(
1). A function f : 
1 ! 
2 is (Borel) measurable if it is (B(
1);B(
2))-
measurable and -measurable if it is (B(
1;);B(
2))-measurable.
Say f is -integrable if it is Lebesgue integrable with respect to the measure . A standard
fact that we will make use of is that a bounded function f : 
 ! R is -integrable if and only if
it is -measurable. (See, e.g., Bogachev, 2006, pages 118, 121-122.)
Call f : 
1 ! 
2 universally measurable if it is -measurable for all  2 (
1) or,
equivalently, if it is (BUM(
1);B(
2))-measurable where BUM(
1) =
T
2(
1) B(
1;). Sets in
T
2(
) B(
;) are called universally measurable sets. The set of universally measurable
10sets contains the set of Borel sets.
We will make use of some facts about universally measurable functions: Any measurable
function is universally measurable. A function f : 
 !  is universally measurable if and only
if it is (BUM(
);BUM())-measurable. (See Fremlin, 2000, page 188.) A consequence is that
the composition of two universally measurable functions is universally measurable. If 
1;
2 are
separable metrizable, f1 : 
1 ! 1 and f1 : 
2 ! 2 are universally measurable if and only if
the product map f : 
 !  is universally measurable. (See Lemma A.1.)
Given a measurable mapping f : 
 ! , write f : (
) ! () for the map that takes each
measure  2 (
) to its image measure under f, i.e., f()(E) = (f 1(E)) for each E 2 B().
Bayesian Games
Let  be a Polish set, to be interpreted as a parameter set or a set of states of Nature.
Throughout, we x a nite player set I and label players as 1;:::;jIj. Write i for a particular
player from I. A -based game is then some   = ((Ci;i)i2I). Here, Ci is a choice or an
action set for player i, which is taken to be Polish. A payo function for player i is a bounded
measurable map i :   C ! R. Extend i to  
Q
j2I (Cj) in the usual way; the extended
functions are again bounded and measurable. A special case will be of particular interest|namely,
a nite game, i.e., a game where the parameter set  and each of the choice sets Ci are each
nite.
To analyze the -based game, we will need to append to the game a -based type structure.
Denition 2.1. A -based type structure is some T = (;(Ti;i)i2I), where each Ti is a (non-
empty) Polish type set for player i and each i is a measurable belief map i : Ti ! (T i)
for player i.
Say T = (;(Ti;i)i2I) is countable if each Ti is at most countable.
Denition 2.2. A -based Bayesian game consists of a pair ( ;T ), where   is a -based
game and T is a -based type structure.
The Bayesian game induces strategies. A strategy for i, viz. si, is a map from Ti to (Ci).
Let Si be the set of strategies for player i.
Bayesian Equilibrium
It will be convenient to introduce the following notation: Fix some ci 2 Ci and write ^ i[ci] :  
Q
j2Infig (Cj) ! R for the mapping with ^ i[ci](; i) = i(;ci; i) where  i 2
Q
j2Infig (Cj).
So ^ i[ci] species the payo of playing action ci, as a function of the payo parameter and mixed
actions of the other players. Each ^ i[ci] is a bounded measurable function. Given some ci 2 Ci
and a strategy prole s i : T i !
Q
j2Infig (Cj), dene i[ci;s i] :   T i ! R so that
i[ci;s i](;t i) = i(;ci;s1(t1);:::;si 1(ti 1);si+1(ti+1);:::;sjIj(tjIj)):
11Note, i[ci;s i] = ^ i[ci]  (id  s i), where id :  !  denotes the identity map. So, i[ci;s i]
species the payo of playing action ci when the others play the strategy prole s i, as a function
of the payo parameter and types of the other players.
Denition 2.3. Say (s1;:::;sjIj) is a Bayesian equilibrium if, for each i 2 I, each ti 2 Ti
and each ci 2 Ci, the following hold:
(i) i[ci;s i] is i(ti)-integrable; and
(ii)
R
T i i[si(ti);s i]di(ti) 
R
T i i[ci;s i]di(ti).
Condition (i) says that each type can compute her expected payos for each possible action ci
she may choose, given that all other players choose the equilibrium strategy. It is automatically
satised for a Bayesian game ( ;T ) with T countable. But, more generally, it must be stated
explicitly. Condition (ii) requires that each type maximize its expected payos, given its associated
belief.
Note, Condition (i) of Denition 2.3 is satised if and only if each i[ci;s i] is i(ti)-measurable.
Since ^ i[ci] :  
Q
j2Infig (Cj) ! R is measurable, this will in turn be satised if the mapping
id  s i :   T i !  
Y
j2Infig
(Cj)
given by (id  s i)(;t i) = (;s i(t i)) is i(ti)-measurable.3 In fact, in a particular class of
games, i(ti)-measurability of id  s i is also necessary for i(ti)-integrability of i[ci;s i].
Denition 2.4. Call a -based game   injective if, for each i and each ci 2 Ci, ^ i[ci] is injective.
Note carefully that a -based game may be injective even if some player's payo function i
is not injective. Many games of interest fail the injectivity condition. But, when the injectivity
condition is met, we have the following characterization of a Bayesian equilibrium.4
Lemma 2.1. Fix a Bayesian Game ( ;T ), where   is injective. For each (ci;s i) 2 Ci  S i
and each i 2 (  T i), i[ci;s i] is i-measurable if and only if (id  s i) is i-measurable.
Corollary 2.1. Fix a Bayesian Game ( ;T ), where   is injective. Then, (s1;:::;sjIj) is a
Bayesian equilibrium if and only if, for each i, each ti 2 Ti and each ci 2 Ci, the following hold:
(i) (id  s i) is i(ti)-measurable; and
(ii)
R
T i i[si(ti);s i]di(ti) 
R
T i i[ci;s i]di(ti).
3A consequence is that Condition (i) is automatically satised if each s i is measurable. That is, the requirement
that the equilibrium strategy be measurable is sucient for Condition (i). Thus, some papers replace Condition (i)
with a measurability requirement. Restricting attention to measurable equilibrium suces for a positive result, i.e.,
to establish existence or to characterize certain behavior as consistent with equilibrium. But, to establish a negative
result, as we have here, it is important to rule out more than simply `a sucient condition cannot be satised.' We
thank Je Ely pointing us to this distinction and thereby to push us toward establishing a signicantly stronger
result than in a previous version of the paper.
4Proofs not found in the main text can be found in the Appendices.
12Universal Bayesian Games and Equilibria
We will want to consider a special case, where the analyst studies a -based Bayesian game
( ;T ), where T  induces all hierarchies of beliefs. Mertens and Zamir (1985), Brandenburger
and Dekel (1993), and Heifetz and Samet (1998) each provide (dierent) canonical constructions
of (-based) type structures that contain all hierarchies of beliefs. Here, we will not need to
make use of the details of a particular construction. Instead, we can focus on certain properties
that each of these constructions satisfy. To state a key property, we will need to introduce some
terminology.
Denition 2.5 (Mertens and Zamir, 1985). Fix two -based structures T = (;(Ti;i)i2I)
and T  = (;(T
i ;
i )i2I) and measurable maps h1;:::;hjIj, where each hi : Ti ! T
i . Call
(h1;:::;hjIj) a type morphism (from T to T ) if, for each i, id  h i  i = 
i  hi.
hi 
βi  β* 
i 
id ✕ h-i 
Δ(Θ×T-i)  Δ(Θ×T-i)  * 
Ti  *  Ti 
Figure 2.1
Denition 2.5 says that (h1;:::;hjIj) is a type morphism if it preserves the belief maps
1;:::;jIj. Specically, it requires that the diagram in Figure 2.1 commutes. Proposition
5.1 in Heifetz and Samet (1998) shows that each type morphism is a mapping that preserves
hierarchies of beliefs, i.e., a hierarchy morphism.
Denition 2.6. Fix a player set I and a parameter set . Call a -based type structure, viz.
T , terminal if, for each -based structure T , there is a type morphism from T to T .
Denition 2.7. Fix a player set I and a parameter set . Call a -based type structure, viz.
T , universal if:
(i) T  it is terminal; and
(ii) T  is non-redundant, i.e., no two types induce the same hierarchies of beliefs.5
5We will not need a formal denition of non-redundancy, since we will only make use of a consequence of the
property.
13Each of the canonical constructions of a \universal type structure" in Mertens and Zamir
(1985), Brandenburger and Dekel (1993), Heifetz and Samet (1998) satisfy Denition 2.7. At
times we will write U() to indicate that the particular -based type structure is universal.
Denition 2.8. Call a -based Bayesian game, viz. ( ;T ), a universal Bayesian game if T
is universal.
Fix some injective game  . Bayesian equilibria of a universal Bayesian game ( ;T ) will
necessarily have a nice measurability property.
Denition 2.9. Call a Bayesian equilibrium, viz. (s1;:::;sjIj), a universally measurable
equilibrium if, for each i and  2 (Ti), si is -measurable.
Lemma 2.2. Fix a -based universal Bayesian game, viz. ( ;U()).
(i) Fix a Bayesian equilibrium (s1;:::;sjIj) of ( ;U()). For each i and each ci 2 Ci, i[ci;s i]
is universally measurable.
(ii) If   is injective, any Bayesian equilibrium of ( ;U()) is a universally measurable equilib-
rium.
Proof. Begin with part (i): Fix some universal Bayesian game ( ;U()) and write U() =
(;(Ui;i)i2I). Note, U() is complete in the sense of Brandenburger (2003), i.e., for each
i 2 (  U i), there is a type ui 2 Ui with i(ui) = i. (See Proposition 4.1 in Friedenberg,
2010 or, alternatively, use Theorem 4 in Meier, 2012.) So, by Condition (i) of Denition 2.3, if
(s1;:::;sjIj) is a Bayesian equilibrium, then for each ci 2 Ci and each i 2 (U i), i[ci;s i]
is i-measurable.
Turn to part (ii): By part (i) and Lemma 2.1, id  s i is universally measurable for each i.
Then, by Lemma A.1, si is universally measurable for each i.
3 The Extension and Pull-Back Properties
We now turn to formalize the extension and pull back properties. To do so, x two -based
structures T = (;(Ti;i)i2I) and T  = (;(T
i ;
i )i2I). We want to map T to T  in a way
that preserves hierarchies of beliefs, i.e., for each player i and each type ti in Ti, there is a type
t
i in T
i that induces the same hierarchy of beliefs. As we have seen, the type morphism concept
allows us to capture this idea without explicitly describing hierarchies of beliefs. We will state
the Extension and Pull-Back properties relative to the type morphism concept. Below we explain
why.
Denition 3.1. Fix -based type structures T and T . Say T can be mapped to T  (via
h1;:::;hjIj) if (h1;:::;hjIj) is a type morphism from T to T .
14Given a -based game  , write si for a strategy of player i in the Bayesian game ( ;T ), and
write s
i for a strategy of player i in the Bayesian game ( ;T ). We begin by stating the Pull-Back
Property.
Denition 3.2. Let T and T  be -based type structures, so that T can be mapped to T . Say a
Bayesian Equilibrium, viz. (s
1;:::;s
jIj), of ( ;T ) can be pulled-back to a Bayesian Equilibrium
of ( ;T ) if, for every type morphism, viz. (h1;:::;hjIj), from T to T , (s
1  h1;:::;s
jIj  hjIj) is
a Bayesian Equilibrium of ( ;T ).
The pair hT ;T i satises the Equilibrium Pull-Back Property for the -based game   if
each Bayesian Equilibrium of ( ;T ) can be pulled-back to a Bayesian Equilibrium of ( ;T ).
To understand Denition 3.2, refer back to Example 1.2. We saw that there exists a hierarchy
preserving map from the structure T  to the structure T . We argued above that the structure
T specied external signals that were not included in the structure T . This was not the idea
we sought to capture. Indeed, this is why we require the mapping, in Denition 3.2, to be a type
morphism and not simply any hierarchy preserving map: There is no type morphism from the
structure T  to the structure T .
To state the Extension Property we will need more. Refer back to Example 1.1. We saw there
exists a hierarchy preserving map from the structure T to the structure T . Indeed, that hierarchy
preserving map is a type morphism, despite the fact that the structure T species external signals
that are not included in the type structure T . While the type morphism concept is sucient to
`rule out' external signals associated with the analyst's type structure, it is insucient to `rule
out' external signals associated with the players' type structure. To understand how these signals
will be ruled out, observe that the type structure T was redundant, in the sense that there were
two types that induce the same hierarchies of beliefs. To `rule out' external signals associated with
the players' type structure, it suces to assume that the players' type structure is non-redundant.
We will not need a formal denition of non-redundancy. Instead, we will make use of a single
property that follows from it|namely, if T can be mapped to T  via (h1;:::;hjIj) and T is
non-redundant, then (h1;:::;hjIj) is injective.6
Denition 3.3. Let T and T  be two -based type structures, so that T can be mapped to T 
via injective maps (h1;:::;hjIj). Say a Bayesian Equilibrium, viz. (s1;:::;sjIj), of ( ;T ) can
be extended to a Bayesian Equilibrium of ( ;T ) if there exists a Bayesian Equilibrium, viz.
(s
1;:::;s
jIj), of ( ;T ) so that (s
1  h1;:::;s
jIj  hjIj) = (s1;:::;sjIj).
The pair hT ;T i satises the Equilibrium Extension Property for the -based game
  if each Bayesian Equilibrium of ( ;T ) can be extended to a Bayesian Equilibrium of ( ;T ).
The pair hT ;T i fails the Equilibrium Extension Property for the -based game   if T
can be mapped to T  via injective maps (h1;:::;hjIj), but there is some Bayesian Equilibrium of
( ;T ) that cannot be extended to a Bayesian Equilibrium of ( ;T ).
6Redundancy implies injectivity but the converse does not hold.
15Observe that, if T cannot be mapped to T  via injective maps, then the pair hT ;T i neither
satises nor fails the Equilibrium Extension Property. The Equilibrium Extension Property is
not dened when one type structure cannot be mapped to the second via injective maps. So,
in particular, Examples 1.1-1.2 do not show a failure of the Equilibrium Extension Property. In
both examples, the unique map from T to T  was not injective. Indeed, there we explained why
those examples do not capture the question of invariance to misspecifying the context of the game.
To address our question, we need to be able to view T as a substructure of T . The injectivity
requirement allows us to do just that.
Remark 3.1. Let T and T  be two -based type structures, so that T can be mapped to T  via
injective maps (h1;:::;hjIj). Then, by Purves's (1966) Theorem, each hi is bimeasurable, i.e., the
image of each measurable set is itself measurable. So, by denition, each hi is an embedding. In
light of this, we will say that T can be embedded into T  via (h1;:::;hjIj) if T can be mapped
to T  via (h1;:::;hjIj), and each hi is injective.
We conclude this section by pointing out some basic observations about the Equilibrium
Pull-Back and Extension Properties, which will be useful in the subsequent analysis. First, the
Equilibrium Pull-Back Property is satised. Indeed, we can also obtain a Measurable Pull-Back
Property. (This property will be useful in arguments to come.) The pair hT ;T i satises the
Measurable Equilibrium Pull-Back Property for the -based game   if any universally
measurable equilibrium of ( ;T ) can be pulled-back to a universally measurable equilibrium of
( ;T ).7
Proposition 3.1. Fix -based type structures, T and T , so that T can be mapped to T .
(i) For any -based game  , the pair hT ;T i satises the Equilibrium Pull-Back Property for
 .
(ii) For any -based game  , the pair hT ;T i satises the Measurable Equilibrium Pull-Back
Property for  .
Second, return back to the idea of a universal Bayesian game. We have the following property.
Lemma 3.1. Fix a -based Bayesian game ( ;T ) so that T can be embedded into U(). Then
the following are equivalent:
(i) The pair hT ;U()i satises the Equilibrium Extension Property for  .
(ii) For every -based structure T  so that T can be embedded into T , the pair hT ;T i satises
the Equilibrium Extension Property for  .
7Observe, the Measurable Equilibrium Pull-Back Property is not a logical implication of the Equilibrium Pull-
Back Property.
164 An Equilibrium Extension Failure
This section shows an example of a nite -based game   and -based type structures T ;T ,
so that hT ;T i fails the Equilibrium Extension Property for  . The game   is built o an
important example in Hellman (2014). Section 6b elaborates on the connection, as well as the
connection to an important paper by Simon (2003).
Example of Extension Failure
 L2 M2 R2
L1 3, 3 2, 2 1, -1
M1 2, 2 3, 3 1, -1
R1 -1, 1 -1, 1 1, 1
 L2 M2 R2
L1 4, 4 6, 7 1, -1
M1 7, 6 4, 4 1, -1
R1 -1, 1 -1, 1 1, 1
 L2 M2 R2
L1 1, 1 1, 1 0, 0
M1 1, 1 1, 1 0, 0
R1 0, 0 0, 0 1, 1
Figure 4.1: A Game that Fails Extension
Figure 4.1 describes a nite -based game  . We point to several features of the game: The
parameter set is  = f;;g. When the parameter is , Li (resp. Mi) uniquely maximizes i's
payos if and only if i's co-player, viz.  i, plays L i (resp. M i). When the parameter is , Li
(resp. Mi) uniquely maximizes i's payos if and only if i's co-player, viz.  i, plays M i (resp.
L i). For any given parameter, Ri maximizes i's payos only if i's co-player, viz.  i, plays R i.
When  2 f;g, Ri maximizes i's payos if and only if both Li and Mi also maximize i's payos.
Remark 4.1. For any -based structure T , ( ;T ) has a Bayesian equilibrium. In particular,
for each ( ;T ), there is a Bayesian equilibrium where each type of each player chooses Ri with
probability one.
Nonetheless, we construct -based structures T  and T , where some equilibrium of ( ;T )
cannot be extended to an equilibrium of ( ;T ). Of course, there will be another equilibrium of
( ;T ) that can be extended to an equilibrium of ( ;T ), i.e., the one just mentioned above.
We will take the players' type structure T  = (;T
1;T
2;
1;
2) to be an arbitrary countable
type structure, i.e., where T
1 and T
2 are countable. Then we have:
Remark 4.2. For any -based countable type structure T , ( ;T ) has a Bayesian equilibrium,
viz. (s
1;s
2), where for each i and each t
i 2 T
i , s
i(t
i) assigns probability one to fLi;Mig.
17To see this, take ^   to be the -based game that diers from   only in restricting the action
sets to fLi;Mig. Then the remark follows from the existence of a Bayesian equilibrium for (^  ;T )
and the fact that Ri is not optimal under any belief that assigns probability one to fL i;M ig.8
We will take the analyst's type structure T  to be some arbitrary universal -based type
structure, viz. U() = (;U1;U2;1;2). This has the property that T  can be mapped to U().
In keeping with Remark 4.1, there is a Bayesian equilibrium of ( ;T ) that can be extended to
a Bayesian equilibrium of ( ;U()), specically the equilibrium where each type of each player i
assigns probability one to Ri. But, we will show:
Theorem 4.1.
(i) There is a Bayesian equilibrium, viz. (s
1;s
2), of ( ;T ) that cannot be extended to a
Bayesian equilibrium of ( ;U()).
(ii) There is a Bayesian equilibrium of ( ;U()).
Part (i) of Theorem 4.1 says that the pair hT ;U()i fails the Equilibrium Extension Property.
Part (ii) says that this failure of Equilibrium Extension is non-trivial. In the statement of Theorem
4.1, we will take (s
1;s
2) to be any equilibrium where, for each player i, each type t
i assigns
probability one to fLi;Mig.
Before coming to the proof, it is worth repeating that Theorem 4.1 delivers a failure of Equilib-
rium Extension with standard ingredients. In particular, the -based game   is nite. Moreover,
for any -based type structure T , there exists an equilibrium of the Bayesian game ( ;T ), a
fortiori for the universal Bayesian game ( ;U()).
Proof of Main Theorem
We now turn to show Theorem 4.1. To do so, we make use of Lemma 3.1. By that Lemma, it
suces to show:
Lemma 4.1. There exists a -based type structure T = (;T1;T2;1;2), so that:
(i) T  can be embedded into T , and
(ii) the pair hT ;T i fails the Equilibrium Extension Property for  .
We turn to construct a -based type structure T = (;T1;T2;1;2) satisfying the require-
ments of Lemma 4.1. To do so, we begin by constructing a subset of the parameters, viz.
 = f;g. Let U() = (;U1;U2;1;2) be a  = f;g-based universal type structure.
We use the -based structure U() to build the -based structure T .
Each Ti is the disjoint union of T
i and Ui, where we endow Ti with the disjoint union topology.
For the map i, refer to Figure 4.2: For each t
i 2 T
i  Ti, take i(t
i)(E i) = 
i (t
i)(E i \ ( 
8It is often taken for granted that there exists a Bayesian equilibrium for some ( 
;T
) where   is nite and
T
 is countable. Takahashi (2009) has written a proof of this claim making use of Glicksberg's (1952) Theorem.
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 i)). For each type ui 2 Ui  Ti, dene i(ui) as follows. Fix some p 2 (0;1) and t
 i 2 T
 i.
(Note, p and t
 i will be chosen to be the same for each type ui 2 Ui.) Take i(ui)(E i) =
pi(ui)(E i\(U i))+(1 p) if (;t
 i) 2 E i. Take i(ui)(E i) = pi(ui)(E i\(U i))
if (;t
 i) = 2 E i.
0	 ﾠ
0	 ﾠ
0	 ﾠ
0	 ﾠ
0 0
0 0
βi(t*i) 
θ*
 
Θ 
U-i  	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠT*-ﾭ‐i	 ﾠ
β*
i(t*
i)  0	 ﾠ
0	 ﾠ
0	 ﾠ
0	 ﾠ
βi(ui) 
θ* 
Θ 
U-i 
p	 ﾠ×	 ﾠγi	 ﾠ(ui)	 ﾠ
0	 ﾠ
0	 ﾠ
1-ﾭ‐p	 ﾠ 0	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠt*
-ﾭ‐i	 ﾠ
Figure 4.2: Constructed Type Structure
Property 4.1. The structure T  can be embedded into T via (id 1;id 2), where id i : T
i ! Ti
denotes the identity map.
Of course, there is a Bayesian equilibrium of ( ;T ), i.e., where each type of i plays Ri with
probability one. But, we will show that there is no Bayesian equilibrium of ( ;T ), viz. (s1;s2),
where each ti 2 T
i  Ti has si(ti)(fLi;Mig) = 1.
Why is this the case? Derive an  = f;g-based game, viz.   = (;C1;C2;1;2), from  :
Take each Ci = fLi;Mig and take each i to be the restriction of i to   C1  C2. The game
  is given in Figure 4.3.
Now we will see two seemingly contradictory facts: First, there is no Bayesian equilibrium
of the game ( ;U()). Second, if there is a Bayesian equilibrium of ( ;T ) so that, for each
i, t
i 2 T
i  Ti plays fLi;Mig with probability one, then there is a Bayesian equilibrium of
( ;U()). Putting these two together, we get that there is no equilibrium of ( ;T ) so that,
for each i, t
i 2 T
i  Ti plays fLi;Mig with probability one. As such, we cannot extend an
equilibrium of ( ;T ) to an equilibrium of ( ;T ). This establishes Lemma 4.1 and completes the
proof of Theorem 4.1.
 L2 M2
L1 3, 3 2, 2
M1 2, 2 3, 3
 L2 M2
L1 4, 4 6, 7
M1 7, 6 4, 4
Figure 4.3: The Restricted Game
We now turn to the two stated steps. First:
19Proposition 4.1. There is no equilibrium of the (nite) -based Bayesian game ( ;U()).9
To see why this is the case, let us recall an important result from Hellman (2014): He studies
the -based game   and shows that there is some associated Bayesian game ( ;T ) with no
universally measurable Bayesian equilibrium.
Proposition 4.2. There exists a -based structure T so that:
(i) [Simon, 2003] there is an equilibrium of the Bayesian game ( ;T ), but
(ii) [Hellman, 2014] there is no universally measurable equilibrium of the Bayesian game ( ;T ).
Part (i) follows from Proposition 1 in Simon (2003). We don't make use of this part; we
only include it for completeness. We will make explicit use of part (ii). The Online Appendix
reviews this result with an eye toward explaining two facts: First, the payos in Figure 4.3 are
formally dierent from those found in Hellman; we verify that Hellman's (2014) arguments apply
to this case. (His proof is robust to changing payos, so long as three conditions are satised. We
change his example so that it satises injectivity.) Second, we show how Hellman's result can be
translated to our framework. (His notion of a type structure is dierent from that here.)
Part (ii) is used to show:
Proposition 4.3. The nite -based universal Bayesian game ( ;U()) does not have a Bayesian
equilibrium.
Proof. Suppose, contra hypothesis, that there is an equilibrium of ( ;U()). Note,   is injective.
So, by Lemma 2.2, the equilibrium is universally measurable. But then, using the Measurable Pull-
Back property (Proposition 3.1), there is a universally measurable equilibrium of ( ;T ), where T
is as in Proposition 4.2(ii). But this contradicts Hellman's (2014) result (i.e., Proposition 4.2).
This shows the rst step. Now we turn to show the second step:
Lemma 4.2. Suppose there is an equilibrium ( ;T ), viz. (s1;s2), so that, for each i and each
t
i 2 T
i  Ti, si(t
i) assigns probability one to fLi;Mig. Then there is a Bayesian equilibrium of
( ;U()).
Proof. Fix a Bayesian Equilibrium, viz. (s1;s2), of ( ;T ) so that, for each i and each t
i 2
T
i  Ti, si(t
i)(fLi;Mig) = 1. We will rst show that, for each i and each ui 2 Ui  Ti,
si(ui)(fLi;Mig) = 1. Then, we will use this fact to construct a Bayesian equilibrium (s1;s2) of
( ;U()).
Fix some ui 2 Ui  Ti. For this type, the expected payos from choosing some ci 2 fLi;Mig
are Z
U i
i[ci;s i]di(ui) = p
Z
U i
i[ci;s i]di(ui) + (1   p):
9While, as a step, we will make use of a Bayesian game without an equilibrium, the nal product will not simply
be a corollary of this fact. See Section 6c for a discussion.
20(Recall, i[ci;s i] = ^ i[ci]  (id  s i).) This type's expected payos from choosing Ri are
Z
U i
i[Ri;s i]di(ui) = p
Z
U i
i[Ri;s i]di(ui):
Note, for any given (;u i) 2   U i and any given ci 2 fLi;Mig,
i[ci;s i](;u i)  i[Ri;s i](;u i):
Since 1   p > 0, it follows that
max
(Z
U i
i[Li;s i]di(ui);
Z
U i
i[Mi;s i]di(ui)
)
>
Z
U i
i[Ri;s i]di(ui):
Thus, it follows from condition (ii) of a Bayesian equilibrium that, for each ui 2 Ui, si(ui)(fLi;Mig) =
1.
Now turn to the  = f;g-based game Bayesian ( ;U()). Construct strategies s1 and s2
as follows: For each ui 2 Ui and each Ei  fLi;Rig, si(ui)(Ei) = si(ui)(Ei). (This is well dened
since si(ui)(fLi;Mig) = 1, as we have shown above.) We will show that (s1;s2) is an equilibrium
of the Bayesian game ( ;U()).
To show condition (i): Fix some ci 2 fLi;Mig and some ui 2 Ui. Let f i : U i ! T i
be the identity mapping. Note that i[ci;s i] = i[ci;s i]f i. Then, by Corollary B.1, i[ci;s i]
is i(ui)-integrable provided that i[ci;s i] is f
 i(i(ui))-integrable. (Note, f
 i(i(ui)) is the
image measure of i(ui) under f i.) The fact that i[ci;s i] is f
 i(i(ui))-integrable follows
from the fact that i[ci;s i] is i(ui)-integrable and Lemma B.2.
To show condition (ii): Fix some ui 2 Ui and some ci 2 fLi;Mig. Then,
Z
T i
i[ci;s i]di(ui) = p
Z
U i
i[ci;s i]di(ui) + (1   p):
Since (s1;s2) is a Bayesian equilibrium with si(ui)(fLi;Mig) = 1 (and si(ui) = si(ui)), it follows
that
p
Z
U i
i[si(ui);s i]di(ui) + (1   p)  p
Z
U i
i[ci;s i]di(ui) + (1   p);
for each ci 2 fLi;Mig. From this,
Z
U i
i[si(ti);s i]di(ui) 
Z
U i
i[ci;s i]di(ui);
for each ci 2 fLi;Mig.
215 Positive Results
In Section 4, we saw that the Equilibrium Extension Property may fail. Now we ask: Are there
(interesting) situations where the Extension Property does obtain? To do so, it will suce to
focus on situations where the players' type structure can be seen as a strict substructure of the
analyst's type structure. We formalize this idea below.
Denition 5.1. Say T can be properly embedded into T  if T can be embedded into T  but
T  cannot be embedded into T .
Fix -based structures T . Say
Q
i2I Ei is a belief-closed subset of T =
Q
i2I Ti if each Ei is
measurable in Ti and, for each ti 2 Ei, i(ti)(  E i) = 1.
Lemma 5.1. Fix -based structures T and T . If T can be embedded into T  via (h1;:::;hjIj),
then
Q
i2I hi(Ti) is a belief-closed subset of T =
Q
i2I T
i .
Now, by the Pull-Back Property, we have:
Corollary 5.1. Let T and T  be two -based type structures, so that T can be embedded into
T  and T  can be embedded into T . Then, the pair hT ;T i satises the Equilibrium Extension
Property.
In light of Corollary 5.1, we will focus on the case in which T can be properly embedded into
T . In this case, we have the following:
Lemma 5.2. Fix -based structures T and T , so that T can be properly embedded into T  via
(h1;:::;hjIj). Then, for some i = 1;:::;jIj, hi(Ti) ( T
i .
5.1 Compact and Continuous Games
In Section 4, we saw that, even in the case of a nite game, the Extension property may fail. Note
two features of the example: First, because the players' type structure was (at most) countable,
each equilibrium of the players' Bayesian game was a universally measurable equilibrium. Second,
there were an uncountable number of types that are in the analyst's structure but not in the
players' structure|so, the analyst's structure is \large" relative to the players' type structure.
This section picks up on these two features. In particular, x a nite game, viz.  , and
an associated \players' Bayesian game," viz. ( ;T ). We will see that, if there are (at most)
a countable number of types that are in the analyst's structure but not the players' structure,
then we will be able to extend any universally measurable equilibrium of the players' structure
to the analyst's structure. Thus, for a nite game, we can only have an extension failure if
either (i) there are an uncountable number of types that are in the analyst's structure but not
the players' structure, or (ii) the original equilibrium (i.e., which we are trying to extend) is not
universally measurable.
22Denition 5.2. Say a -based game, viz.   = (;(Ci;i)i2I), is compact and continuous if
each Ci is compact and each i is continuous.
(Note, there is no requirement that  be compact.)
Proposition 5.1. Fix -based structures T and T , so that T can be properly embedded into T 
via (h1;:::;hjIj) and each T
1nh1(T1);:::;T
jIjnhjIj(TjIj) is (at most) countable. If   is compact and
continuous, then any universally measurable equilibrium of ( ;T ) can be extended to a universally
measurable equilibrium of ( ;T ).
The proof can be found in Appendix D. Here, we give the idea. In so doing, we will see the role
of the requirements that each T
i nhi(Ti) is countable and that each si is universally measurable.
Suppose T can be embedded into T  via (h1;:::;hjIj). Fix a universally measurable equilib-
rium (s1;:::;sjIj) of the Bayesian game ( ;T ). We want to show that there is an equilibrium of
the Bayesian Game ( ;T ), viz. (s
1;:::;s
jIj), that extends the equilibrium (s1;:::;sjIj), i.e., that
satises (s1;:::;sjIj) = (s
1  h1;:::;s
jIj  hjIj).
We will begin by constructing a certain game of complete information, viz. G, that depends
on the game   and the equilibrium (s1;:::;sjIj). There will be many players in this game, each
corresponding to a type in T
i nhi(Ti) for some player i. As such, there are (at most) a countable
number of players in this game. Each such player ti 2 T
i nhi(Ti) gets to make a choice from Ci,
as in  . The payo functions will be constructed in a specic way. In particular, they will depend
on   and the equilibrium (s1;:::;sjIj).
The complete information game G is compact and continuous. Compactness follows from the
fact that the underlying game is compact. Continuity uses the fact that the underlying game is
continuous, but it does not follow immediately from this fact. There are two issues: First, the
payo functions depend on the equilibrium and the equilibrium may be discontinuous. Second,
there may be an innite (but countable) number of players in the game and, when there are a
countable number of players, payo functions may be discontinuous even if the choice set is nite.
See Peleg (1969).10
Now we have a compact and continuous complete information game G, with a countable
number of players. As such, we can apply Glicksberg's (1952) xed-point theorem to show that
there exists a mixed-strategy equilibrium of G.
Finally, we return to the Bayesian game ( ;T ). We consider strategies that extend the
equilibrium (s1;:::;sjIj) of ( ;T ). We show that, in a certain sense, these strategies correspond
to the mixed strategies of the complete information game G. As such, we can use the fact that
there is a mixed strategy equilibrium of G to show that there is an equilibrium of ( ;T ) that
extends the equilibrium (s1;:::;sjIj) of ( ;T ).
10Satoru Takahashi pointed us to the fact that, if a game with a countable number of players is (in a sense)
\generated" by a compact and continuous game of incomplete information, then the payo functions are nonetheless
continuous. In so doing, Takahashi generalized a result in a previous version of this paper. We are very much
indebted to Satoru for this contribution.
23Notice, it is important, for this argument, that we begin with a universally measurable equilib-
rium of the Bayesian game ( ;T ). To see why, suppose that we begin instead with an equilibrium,
viz. (s1;:::;sjIj), that is not universally measurable. Then, by Lemma A.1, some id  s i is not
-measurable for some  2 (  T i). Notice, there may be a type t
i 2 T
i nhi(Ti) so that

i (t
i)(  h i(T i)) = 1 and 
i (t
i)(j  h i(T i)) = . Then for any extension of s i, viz.
s
 i, id  s
 i is not 
i (t
i)-measurable. In this case, we cannot associate an equilibrium of the
complete information game with an equilibrium of the Bayesian game ( ;T ).11 Of course, for
a type structure with (at most) a countable number of types, all strategies are measurable. As
such, an equilibrium is a universally measurable equilibrium. With this, we have the following
corollary:
Corollary 5.2. Fix -based structures T and T , so that T can be properly embedded into T . If
  is compact and continuous and T  is countable, then any equilibrium of ( ;T ) can be extended
to an equilibrium of ( ;T ).
5.2 The Common Prior Assumption
In this section, we will see that, if the analyst's structure satises the common prior assumption,
then we have the Extension Property. Note, this holds independent of the underlying game  ,
i.e., even if   is not compact or continuous.
To see why, let us begin by reviewing the analysis in Section 4. There, we had -based
structures T  = (;T
1;T
2;
1;
2) and U() = (;U1;U2;1;2). The structure T  can be
viewed as a belief-closed subset of U(). Write h1(T
1)  h2(T
2)  U1  U2 for this belief closed
subset. Note, types in this belief closed subset impose an equilibrium restriction on (some) types
outside of this subset. This is because there are types in Uinhi(T
i ) that assign strictly positive
probability to types in h i(T
 i). This problem would not arise if the only types in the analyst's
structure that assigned positive probability to types in h i(T
 i) are types that are in hi(T
i ). (Of
course, this is not the case in a universal type structure.)
With the above in mind, consider the following scenario: Suppose we instead have a type
structure, viz. T , that can be viewed as the union of two type structures. For a given game,
can we extend an equilibrium associated with one of these structures to an equilibrium associated
with T ? The answer will be yes if and only if there exists an equilibrium associated with the
other structure.
Let us rst formalize the idea that a type structure T  can be viewed as the union of some
structure T and some `remaining structure,' which we'll call the dierence structure.
Denition 5.3. Fix -based structures T and T . Say T induces a decomposition of T  (via
(h1;:::;hjIj)) if T can be embedded into T  via (h1;:::;hjIj) and
Q
i2I T
i nhi(Ti) is a belief-closed
subset of T.
11There is the question of whether we can instead begin with the weaker requirement that each i[ci;s i] is
universally measurable. We do not know. In Appendix D, we point out that our proof of continuity breaks down
with this weaker assumption.
24Note, if T induces a decomposition of T  (via (h1;:::;hjIj)), then both
Q
i2I hi(Ti) and
Q
i2I(T
i nhi(Ti)) are belief-closed subsets of T. Any belief-closed subset of T  induces, what
we will call, a separable metrizable type structure, i.e., a structure that diers from Denition 2.1
only in the fact that the type sets may not be complete. (See Lemma E.1.) So, we can view the -
based structure T  as the union of two metrizable -based structures: the structure induced
by T (which corresponds to the belief-closed set
Q
i2I hi(Ti)) and the dierence structure
(which corresponds to the belief-closed set
Q
i2I(T
i nhi(Ti))). Write
(T nT ) = (;(T
i nhi(Ti);O
i )i2I);
for this dierence structure. (Here, O
i (t
i)(EO) = 
i (t
i)(EO) for each event EO in 
Q
j6=i(T
j nhj(Tj)).
Again, refer to Lemma E.1 for details.)
Now, we can state the result.
Lemma 5.3. Fix -based structures T and T , so that T induces a decomposition of T . Fix,
also, a -based game   so that ( ;T ) has an equilibrium. Then, hT ;T i satises the Equilibrium
Extension Property for   if and only if there is an equilibrium of the dierence game ( ;(T nT )).
As a consequence of Lemma 5.3 and the Pull-Back Property, we have the following:
Proposition 5.2. Fix -based structures T and T , so that T induces a decomposition of T .
Fix, also, a -based game  , so that ( ;T ) has an equilibrium. Then, hT ;T i satises the
Equilibrium Extension Property for   if and only if there is an equilibrium for the Bayesian game
( ;T ).
In contrast to Proposition 5.1, Proposition 5.2 does not restrict attention to universally mea-
surable equilibria nor does it require   to be compact and continuous. That said, it imposes
restrictions on the players' and analyst's type structures.
Taken together, Propositions 3.1 and 5.2 say: If T induces a decomposition of T , then hT ;T i
satises the Equilibrium Extension Property for   if and only if either both ( ;T ) and ( ;T )
have an equilibrium or both ( ;T ) and ( ;T ) do not have an equilibrium. So, here, we cannot
have the Extension failure when there is an equilibrium for ( ;T ).
Let's now ask: Is it of interest to consider the case where T induces a decomposition of T ? We
will show that there is a notable case in which T does induce a decomposition of T . Specically,
if the analyst's structure, viz. T , admits a common prior, then the players' structure must induce
a decomposition of the analyst's structure.
Why is this the case? Recall, the common prior assumption (CPA) reects the idea that
dierences in beliefs reect only dierences in information. That is, if an outside observer looks
at the situation, he can understand the dierent beliefs (i.e., associated with dierent types) as
reecting some underlying belief, common to both players. Each type of each player reects the
conditional of this belief on certain information.
25Under a common prior, what does Izzy think Joe thinks about Izzy? Can a type of Izzy
consider it possible that Joe considers that type of Izzy impossible? The answer would seem to
be no. In particular, this appears to require that Izzy considers it possible that Joe has learned
certain information that is inconsistent with the information she herself learned. This suggests
that, if a type structure satises the CPA, then it also satises a mutual absolute continuity
condition|i.e., if a type t
i of Izzy considers a type t
j of Joe possible (i.e., if 
i (t
i)(  ft
jg 
T
 i j) > 0 ), then that type t
j of Joe also considers the given type t
i of Izzy possible (i.e., then

j(t
j)(  ft
ig  T
 i j) > 0). Note, here, we write T
 i j for
Q
k6=i;j T
k.
Going back to the structures T and T , suppose the analyst's structure satises the common
prior assumption. We have just argued that it also satises a mutual absolute continuity con-
dition. Consider a type t
i that is not contained in the structure induced by T . Can the type
t
i assign strictly positive probability to a type of Joe in the structure induced by T ? No. The
structure induced by T is a belief-closed subset. So, types in this structure cannot assign positive
probability to the type t
i, which is what mutual absolute continuity would require. As such, the
type t
i must assign probability one to types in (what will be) the dierence structure. That is,
T induces a decomposition of T .
Let us state these facts formally: Fix a -based type structure T = (;(Ti;i)i2I)). Write
[ti] for the event   ftig  T i. Given a measure  2 (  T) with ([ti]) > 0, write (jj[ti])
for conditional of  on [ti] and write marg T i for the marginal of  on   T i.
Denition 5.4. Fix a -based type structure T = (;(Ti;i)i2I)). Call  2 (T) a common
prior (for T ) if T is countable and, for each player i and each ti 2 Ti,
(i) ([ti]) > 0,
(ii) i(ti) = marg T i(jj[ti]).
Say the structure T admits a common prior if there is a common prior for T .
Denition 5.5 (Stuart, 1997). Say a -based type structure T = (;(Ti;i)i2I)) is mutu-
ally absolutely continuous if T is countable and, for every pair of (distinct) players i;j 2 I,
i(ti)(  ftjg  T i j) > 0 implies j(tj)(  ftig  T i j) > 0.
Now, the connections.
Lemma 5.4. Fix a -based type structure T = (;(Ti;i)i2I)), where T admits a common prior.
Then, T is mutually absolutely continuous.
Lemma 5.5. Fix non-redundant -based structures T and T , so that T can be properly embedded
into T  via (h1;:::;hjIj). If T  is mutually absolutely continuous, then T induces a decomposition
of T  via (h1;:::;hjIj).
Now, as a Corollary of Lemma 5.5 and Proposition 5.2, we have:
26Corollary 5.3. Fix -based structures T and T , so that T can be properly embedded into T 
and so that T  satises mutual absolute continuity. Fix, also, a -based game  , so that ( ;T )
has an equilibrium. Then, hT ;T i satises the Equilibrium Extension Property for   if and only
if there is an equilibrium for the Bayesian game ( ;T ).
And, as a corollary of Lemma 5.4 and Corollary 5.3, we have12:
Proposition 5.3. Fix -based structures T and T , so that T can be properly embedded into
T  and so that T  admits a common prior. Fix, also, a -based game  , so that ( ;T ) has an
equilibrium. Then, hT ;T i satises the Equilibrium Extension Property for   if and only if there
is an equilibrium for the Bayesian game ( ;T ).
This says that, if the analyst's structure satises the common prior assumption, then the only
way we can have an Extension failure is if there is an equilibrium of the players' Bayesian game
but not the analyst's Bayesian game.
Notice, if the analyst's structure satises the common prior assumption, then both the players
and analyst's structure have (at most) a countable number of types. So, in this case, if   is compact
and continuous, then both the players' and analyst's Bayesian game do have an equilibrium. (See
Footnote 8.) This is a special case of Corollary 5.2.
6 Discussion
This section discusses the relationship to the literature, and further discusses the results.
a. The Context of the Game: There are two distinct views of a game. Under the rst view,
the game itself is a complete description of all interactions past, present, and future. See, for
instance, the discussion in Kohlberg and Mertens (1986). Under the second view, it is impractical
to write down \the big game." Instead, the game studied represents a snapshot of the strategic
situation. This is a game-theoretic analog to Savage's (1972) Small Worlds view in decision
theory.
Our position is that each of these views is of interest|both deserve to be studied. Here, we
focus on the second view, where there is a history prior to the given game. As such, it seems
natural to consider the case where the history inuences which hierarchies of beliefs players can
hold. That is, it seems natural to consider the case in which the history determines the context
of the game.
In this case, two robustness questions arise. First, what if the players know more than the
analyst? This is the question we focused on here, i.e., the Extension Problem. But we can also
address a second question. What if the analyst rules out more hierarchies than the players? This
12Note that in the special case where   is compact and continuous, Corollary 5.3 and Proposition 5.3 follow directly
from Proposition 5.1: All involved type sets are at most countable, and therefore all equilibria are measurable.
27corresponds to the Pull-Back Problem. In this case, the analyst will not lose any prediction, but
may instead introduce extraneous predictions.
b. Proof of Extension Failure: Section 4 constructs a non-pathological example of two -
based Bayesian games so that we cannot extend an equilibrium of the players' Bayesian game to the
analyst's Bayesian game, despite the fact that there is an equilibrium of the analyst's Bayesian
game. To do so, it rst constructs a pathological example of a -based extension failiure. In
particular, it constructs a -based Bayesian game ( ;U())|where   is a nite -based game
and U() is a -based universal structure|so that there is no Bayesian equilibrium of ( ;U()).
To the best of our knowledge, this is the rst such example in the literature.
The example of ( ;U()) builds on a result of Hellman (2014): There exists a nite -based
Bayesian game ( ;T ), so that any Bayesian equilibrium (s1;s2) of ( ;T ) has some player i with
si that is not i measurable for some i 2 (Ti). There is an analogous earlier result of Simon
(2003). We explicitly use Hellman's example and not Simon's. Below we review these results and
why we make this choice.
First, let's start with Hellman's (2014) result|that any Bayesian equilibrium of ( ;T ), viz.
(s1;s2), has some si that is not i-measurable for a i 2 (Ti). Note, the measure i does not
correspond to the belief of any type of  i in T . So, we cannot conclude \if a strategy prole
is a proposed Bayesian equilibrium, some type in the model will not be able to compute its
expected payos." And, indeed, there is a Bayesian equilibrium of Hellman's example; all types
can, of course, compute their expected payos under the Bayesian equilibrium. (Again, this is a
consequence of Proposition 1 in Simon, 2003.)
Certainly, formally, non-existence in the universal Bayesian game ( ;U()) is not a far leap
from Hellman's result. Nonetheless, we note that Hellman does not make this leap.13 Moreover,
making the leap appears to require either a proof distinct from Hellman (2014) or a modication of
Hellman's example: Note, Hellman's is about non-measurability of a strategy mapping|namely
si. To nd a violation of a Bayesian equilibrium, we need non-integrability of a payo mapping|
namely i[ci;s i]. We modify Hellman's to have an example that satises the injectivity. Then we
use Lemma 2.1 (plus standard properties of U()) to draw the connection and reach the desired
conclusion.
Simon's example is also about non-measurability of a strategy mapping. We don't know if,
in the context of his example, it implies non-measurability (and so non-integrability) of a payo
mapping and, likewise, we don't know if we can modify his example to obtain non-measurability
of a payo mapping. As such, we make use of Hellman's example instead.
c. Ingredients of the Extension Failure: The negative result in Section 4 makes use of a
Bayesian game without an equilibrium. But, it is important to note that the result is not simply
13After learning of our result, Hellman added an example, modifying his original example. There is no Bayesian
equilibrium of this modied Bayesian game. This modied example is not an example of a universal Bayesian game.
28a corollary of the fact that there is some Bayesian game that does not have an equilibrium. In
particular, we have seen an example of a (nite) -based Bayesian game ( ;T ) where we cannot
extend an equilibrium of this game to an equilibrium of ( ;U()), despite the fact that there
is an equilibrium of this Bayesian game. Moreover, each belief closed subset of U() induces a
Bayesian game that does have an equilibrium.
To better understand the connection between Extension failures and non-existence, it may be
useful to compare this analysis to another solution concept, namely correlated rationalizability.
There are games|albeit, perhaps, pathological games|for which the set of rationalizable strate-
gies is empty. (See Example 2 in Dufwenberg and Stegeman, 2002.) Yet, we have the following
result.
Result: Fix -based structures, T and T , so that T can be properly embedded into
T . Fix also a -based game  . If the rationalizable strategies are non-empty in both
the Bayesian games ( ;T ) and ( ;T ), then hT ;T i satises rationalizable extension
and pull-back properties for  . 14
As such, a non-existence example (as in Dufwenberg and Stegeman, 2002) cannot be used to get
an Extension failure where the analyst's Bayesian game satises existence.
To sum up: Certainly, we can have an Extension failure that stems from the fact that there
is a prediction associated with the players' Bayesian game but not the analyst's Bayesian game.
Such an Extension failure necessarily stems from an Existence problem. But, the case of interest
is the case where there is a prediction associated with the analyst's game. In this case, whether we
do vs. do not have such an Extension failure depends on the particular solution concept studied.
In particular, for Bayesian equilibrium there is such an Extension failure while for correlated
rationalizability there is no such Extension failure|this is the case despite the fact that, for both
solution concepts, there are Bayesian games that fail existence.
d. The Common Prior Assumption: Denition 5.4 states that the CPA reects two re-
quirements, a common prior requirement and a positivity requirement.
Consider the sets [ti] = ftigT i and note that these sets form a partition of T. Write
i for the subalgebra generated by this partition. Given a measure  2 (T) and an event E
in T, write (E;jji) for a version of -conditional probability of E given i. (Note, since the
conditioning events for Izzy and Joe are distinct, the versions of conditional probability will also
be distinct.) The common prior requirement is: There exists a measure  2 (  T) and
a version of -conditional probability of E given i so that, for any type ti and any event E in
[ti], i(ti)(proj T iE) = (E;[ti]jji). (Note, (E;jji) is constant on [ti].) Positivity requires
that, in addition, ([ti]) > 0, for each type ti 2 Ti.
14A proof is available upon request. Dekel, Fudenberg and Morris (2007) show an analogous result, when the
parameter and action sets are nite.
29The positivity requirement is important for Proposition 5.3. To see this, return to the type
structure T  in Section 4 and note that this structure satises the common prior requirement. In
particular, the measure  2 (T) with (f(3;t1;t2;t3)g) = 1 is a common prior for T . Of
course, it is not positive. Thus, we can see that the common prior requirement alone does not
suce for Proposition 5.3. We also need the positivity requirement.
The need for the positivity requirement is important from the perspective of generalizing
Proposition 5.3. In particular, if Ti is uncountably innite, there is no probability measure that
assigns strictly positive probability to each event [ti]. This suggests a limitation to Proposition
5.3. Alternatively, this might suggest that other tools are needed to study the case of uncountably
innite spaces|i.e., lexicographic probability systems (Blume, Brandenburger and Dekel, 1991),
conditional probability systems (R enyi, 1955), or non-standard probabilities.
There is an interesting connection to be made at the conceptual level. Does a non-positive
common prior t with the CPA? Arguably not. Recall, the idea of the CPA is that dierences in
probabilities only reect dierences in information. As a consequence, the only personalistic fea-
tures of probability should come from informational dierences. But, there may be many (regular
and proper) versions of conditional probability. Given this, the common prior requirement (as
specied above) need not pin down the beliefs (i.e., each i(ti)). Indeed, in the example above,
there are many -based structures T corresponding to the common prior . In fact, choosing
distinct probabilities p gives just such structures.
Appendix A Proofs for Section 2
Lemma A.1. Fix separable metrizable spaces 
1;
2;1, and 2. Let f1 : 
1 ! 1, f2 : 
2 ! 2
and write f : 
 !  for the associated product map.
(i) If f1 and f2 are universally measurable, then f is universally measurable.
(ii) If f is universally measurable, then f1 and f2 are universally measurable.
Proof. Begin with part (i). Assume f1 and f2 are universally measurable. Since 
1;
2 are
separable and metrizable, B(12) = B(1)B(2). Thus, to show f is (BUM(
1
2);B(1
2))-measurable, it suces to show that, for each E1  E2 2 B(1)  B(2), f 1(E1  E2) 2
BUM(
1  
2). By universal measurability of f1;f2, f 1(E1  E2) = f 1
1 (E1)  f 1
2 (E2) 2
BUM(
1)  BUM(
2). Since BUM(
1)  BUM(
2)  BUM(
) (see, e.g., Fremlin, 2000, page 202),
the conclusion follows.
Now assume that f is universally measurable. Fix some 1 2 (
1) and some E1 2 B(1).
We will show that there are Borel sets F1;G1 2 B(
1) so that F1  f 1
1 (E1)  G1 and 1(F1) =
1(G1). Thus, f1 is universally measurable. (And, analogously, for f2.)
Fix !
2 2 
2 and dene k : 
1 ! 
1
2 so that k(!1) = (!1;!
2). Certainly, k is measurable.
Dene  as the image measure of 1 under k. Since f is universally measurable, there are
30Borel sets F;G  B(
1  
2) so that F  f 1(E1  2)  G and (F) = (G). Note that
f 1(E1  2) = f 1
1 (E1)  
2.
Since (
1f!
2g) = 1, we have that (F \(
1f!
2g)) = (F) = (G) = (G\(
1f!
2g)),
and F \ (
1  f!
2g)  f 1
1 (E1)  f!
2g  G \ (
1  f!
2g). Dene F1 = proj 
1(F \ (
1  f!
2g)
and G1 = proj 
1(G\(
1 f!
2g). Then, F1;G1 2 B(
1) (Aliprantis and Border, 2007, Theorem
4.44 and Lemma 4.46) with F1  f 1
1 (E1)  G1. Moreover, since F \ (
1  f!
2g) = F1  f!
2g,
G \ (
1  f!
2g) = G1  f!
2g, and (
1  f!
2g) = 1, we have 1(F1) = (F1  f!
2g) =
(G1  f!
2g) = 1(G1).
Proof of Lemma 2.1 . Fix a Bayesian Game ( ;T ), where   is injective. Fix also a strategy
prole s i : T i !
Q
j2Infig (Cj). We will show that, for each ci 2 Ci and i 2 (  T i),
(id  s i) is i-measurable if and only if i[ci;s i] is i-measurable.
First suppose that (id  s i) is i-measurable. Then, using the fact that i[ci;s i] = ^ i[ci] 
(id  s i) and ^ i[ci] is measurable, it follows that i[ci;s i] is i-measurable.
Next suppose that i[ci;s i] is i-measurable. Let F 2 B( 
Q
j2Infig (Cj)). We want to
show that (ids i) 1(F) 2 B(T i;i). Note that (i[ci;s i]) 1() = (ids i) 1((^ i[ci]) 1()),
and therefore
(id  s i) 1(F) = (id  s i) 1((^ i[ci]) 1(^ i[ci](F))) = (i[ci;s i]) 1(^ i[ci](F)):
By Purves' Theorem (Purves, 1966) and the fact that ^ i[ci] is injective and measurable, ^ i[ci](F) 2
B(R). Thus, since i[ci;s i] is i-measurable, (id  s i) 1(F) = (i[ci;s i]) 1(^ i[ci](F)) 2
B(  T i;i), as required.
Appendix B Proofs for Sections 3 and 4
Lemma B.1. Fix Polish spaces 
;
 and a Borel measurable mapping f : 
 ! 
. Let g : 
 ! R
and g : 
 ! R be such that g = g  f. For each  2 (
), if g is f()-measurable, then g is
-measurable.
Proof. Assume g is f()-measurable. Then, for E  R Borel, (g) 1(E) 2 B(
;f()). This
says that there are Borel sets X;Y   
 with X  (g) 1(E)  Y  and f()(X) = f()(Y ).
Then, f 1(X);f 1(Y ) are Borel subsets of 
 with f 1(X)  f 1((g) 1(E))  f 1(Y ) and
(f 1(X)) = (f 1(Y )). Note, f 1((g) 1(E)) = g 1(E) so that f 1(X)  g 1(E) 
f 1(Y ). From this g 1(E) 2 B(
;), as required.
Corollary B.1. Fix Polish spaces 
;
 and a Borel measurable mapping f : 
 ! 
. Let
g : 
 ! R and g : 
 ! R be bounded functions such that g = g  f. For each  2 (
), if g
is f()-integrable, then g is -integrable.
Proof of Proposition 3.1. Begin with part (i): Fix a Bayesian equilibrium, viz. (s
1;:::;s
jIj),
31of ( ;T ). We will show that (s1;:::;sjIj) = (s
1  h1;:::;s
jIj  hjIj) is a Bayesian Equilibrium of
( ;T ).
Begin with condition (i) of Denition 2.3. Fix some ti 2 Ti and ci and note that, by the fact
that (s
1;:::;s
jIj) is an equilibrium 
i[ci;s
 i] is 
i (hi(ti))-integrable. Note 
i (hi(ti)) is the image
measure of i(ti) under id  h i. Moreover, 
i[ci;s
 i]  (id  h i) = i[ci;s i]. Thus, it follows
from Corollary B.1 that i[ci;s i] is i(ti)-integrable.
Now turn to Condition (ii) of Denition 2.3. Fix some type ti 2 Ti and some choice ci of the
Bayesian game ( ;T ). We have that
Z
T i
i[s
i(hi(ti));s
 i  h i]di(ti) =
Z
T i
i(;s
i(hi(ti));s
 i(h i(t i)))di(ti)
=
Z
T
 i
i(;s
i(hi(ti));s
 i(t
 i))d
i (hi(ti))

Z
T
 i
i(;ci;s
 i(t
 i))d
i (hi(ti))
=
Z
T i
i(;ci;s
 i(h i(t i)))di(ti)
=
Z
T i
i[ci;s
 i  h i]di(ti);
where the second and fourth lines use the Change of Variables Theorem (e.g., Billingsley, 2008,
Theorem 16.13) plus the fact that (h1;:::;hjIj) is a type morphism and the third line uses the fact
that (s
1;:::;s
jIj) is a Bayesian equilibrium of ( ;T ). This establishes condition (ii) of Denition
2.3.
Now turn to part (ii): Fix a universally measurable Bayesian equilibrium, viz. (s
1;:::;s
jIj),
of ( ;T ). By part (i), (s1;:::;sjIj) = (s
1  h1;:::;s
jIj  hjIj) is a Bayesian equilibrium. We will
show that each si is -measurable, for each  2 (Ti). For this, x  and let  = hi(). Since
the Bayesian equilibrium (s
1;:::;s
jIj) is universally measurable, s
i is -measurable. Then, by
Lemma B.1, si is -measurable.
Proof of Lemma 3.1. Fix a -based Bayesian game ( ;T ) where T can be embedded into
U(). First suppose that, for each -based structure T , so that T can be embedded into T ,
the pair hT ;T i satises the Equilibrium Extension Property for  . Then certainly this is the
case when T  = U(). We show that, if the pair hT ;U()i satises the Equilibrium Extension
Property for  , then the pair hT ;T i also satises the Equilibrium Extension Property for  ,
where T  is some -based structure so that T can be embedded into T .
To show this, it will be useful to begin with properties of the mappings between these
structures. By assumption, there exists an injective type morphism, viz. (h1;:::;hjIj), from
T to T . Since U() is terminal, there is also a (not necessarily injective) type morphism
(l1;:::;ljIj) from T  to U(). Note, the map (l1  h1;:::;ljIj  hjIj) is a type morphism from
32T to U() = (;(Ui;i)i2I). To see this, x an event E in   U i and note that
i(li(hi(ti)))(E) = 
i (hi(ti))((id  l i) 1(E))
= i(ti)((id  h i) 1((id  l i) 1(E))),
where the rst line uses the fact that (l1;:::;ljIj) is a type morphism from T  to U() and the
second line uses the fact that (h1;:::;hjIj) is a type morphism from T to T . So, i(li(hi(ti)))
is the image measure of i(ti) under (id  l i)  (id  h i) = id  (l i  h i), as required. An
implication is that T can be mapped to U() via (l1  h1;:::;ljIj  hjIj).
Now observe that, by assumption, we have an injective type morphism (k1;:::;kjIj) from
T to U(). We also have that (l1  h1;:::;ljIj  hjIj) is a type morphism from T to U().
Since U() is non-redundant and type morphisms preserve hierarchies of beliefs, it follows that
(l1  h1;:::;ljIj  hjIj) = (k1;:::;kjIj), i.e., (l1  h1;:::;ljIj  hjIj) is injective.
Let (s1;:::;sjIj) be a Bayesian equilibrium of ( ;T ). Since hT ;U()i satises the Extension
Property for  , there exists an equilibrium (r1;:::;rjIj) of ( ;U()) so that (s1;:::;sjIj) = (r1 
l1  h1;:::;rjIj  ljIj  hjIj). The Pull-Back Property (Proposition 3.1) gives that (s
1;:::;s
jIj) =
(r1  l1;:::;rjIj  ljIj) is an equilibrium of ( ;T ). Thus, (s1;:::;sjIj) = (s
1  h1;:::;s
jIj  hjIj), as
required.
Lemma B.2. Fix some  2 (
) and some -measurable f : 
 ! R. Suppose there is ! 2 

so that (f!g) 2 (0;1). Then, f is ((j
nf!g))-measurable.
Proof. Fix some E Borel in R. Since f is -measurable, there are Borel sets F;G  
 with
F  f 1(E)  G and (F) = (G). We will show that F  f 1(E)  G and (Fj
nf!g) =
(Gj
nf!g): Since (F) = (G) and (f!g) > 0, it must be that either ! 62 F [ G or
! 2 F \ G. From this the claim follows.
Appendix C Proofs for Section 5
Proof of Lemma 5.1. Fix -based structures T and T , so that T can be embedded into T 
via (h1;:::;hjIj). Then, each hi(Ti) 2 B(Ti) and so each  
Q
j2Infig hj(Tj) 2 B(  T i). So,
by denition of a type morphism, for any hi(ti) 2 hi(Ti),

i (hi(ti))( 
Y
j2Infig
hj(Tj)) = i(ti)(  T i) = 1;
as desired.
Proof of Lemma 5.2. Fix -based structures T and T , so that T can be embedded into T 
via (h1;:::;hjIj). Suppose, for each i, hi(Ti) = T
i . Write gi = (hi) 1 : T
i ! Ti. (This is well
33dened since, by assumption, each hi is bijective.) We will show that T  can be embedded into
T via (g1;:::;gjIj).
Certainly, each gi is an injective bimeasurable map. It suces to show that (g1;:::;gjIj) is
a type morphism from T  to T : For this, x some gi(t
i) 2 Ti and some Borel E i    T i.
Then,
i(gi(t
i))(E i) = i(gi(t
i))((id  h i) 1((id  g i) 1(E i)))
= 
i (hi(gi(t
i)))((id  g i) 1(E i))
= 
i (t
i)((id  g i) 1(E i))
where the rst and last lines are by denition and the second line uses the fact that (h1;:::;hjIj)
is a type morphism from T to T . This establishes the desired conclusion.
Appendix D Proofs for Section 5.1
This appendix is devoted to proving Proposition 5.1. Throughout, we make use of the following
notational conventions: Given sets 
1;:::;
jIj and some subset K  f1;:::;jIjg, write 
K =
Q
k2K 
k and write !K for a prole in 
K. Likewise, given maps f1;:::;fjIj, where each fi : 
i !
i, write fK : 
K ! K for the associated product map.
Fix two (non-redundant) -based type structures T = (;(Ti;i)i2I) and T  = (;(T
i ;
i )i2I).
Suppose, further, that T can be properly embedded into T  via (h1;:::;hjIj), so that each
T
1nh1(T1);:::;T
jIjnhjIj(TjIj) is (at most) countable (and possibly empty). By Lemma 5.2, there is
some i = 1;:::;jIj, so that T
i nhi(Ti) is non-empty. Order players so that (a) for each i = 1;:::;J,
T
i nhi(Ti) 6= ; and (b) for each i = J +1;:::;jIj, T
i nhi(Ti) = ; (if J < jIj). For each i = 1;:::;J,
write M(i) for the cardinality of T
i nhi(Ti) and m(i) for some element of T
i nhi(Ti). By assump-
tion, M(i) is (at most) countable.
Consider a -based compact and continuous game   = (;(Ci;i)i2I). Throughout this ap-
pendix, we x a universally measurable equilibrium of the Bayesian game ( ;T ), viz. (s1;:::;sjIj).
We want to show that there is a universally measurable equilibrium of the Bayesian game ( ;T ),
viz. (s
1;:::;s
jIj), with (s1;:::;sjIj) = (s
1  h1;:::;s
jIj  hjIj).
Section 5.1 gives the idea of the proof. In particular, we begin by constructing the game
of complete information, namely G. The game has a nite or countable number of players,
corresponding to
SJ
i=1 T
i nhi(Ti). The choice set for a player m(i) 2 T
i nhi(Ti) is Ci. Write Ci for
the set [Ci]M(i), so that C =
QJ
i=1 Ci is the set of choice proles in this game. Note, we can think
of   ! c i = (c1
i;c2
i;:::) 2 Ci as a mapping   ! c i : T
i nhi(Ti) ! Ci. So, when we write   ! c i(t
i) we mean
the t
i-th component of   ! c i = (c1
i;c2
i;:::). Likewise, given a subset of players K  f1;:::;Jg, we
can think of the mapping   ! c K :
Q
i2K(T
i nhi(Ti)) ! CK. Write   ! c K(t
K) for the prole in CK
with   ! c K(t
K) = (  ! c i(t
i) : i 2 K). Note, we endow T
i nhi(Ti) with the discrete topology and so
34the mapping   ! c i is continuous.
We now want to dene a payo function um(i) : C ! R for player m(i) (in the game G). To
do so, it will be useful to rst dene auxiliary (payo) functions for m(i) that depend on subsets
of players. The function um(i) will be, eectively, the sum of these auxiliary functions.
Fix some player i and consider a subset K of players not containing i, i.e., some K 
f1;:::;Jgnfig. Write Kc = f1;:::;Ign(K [ fig), i.e., all players that are not in K [ fig. Let us
give the loose idea: We will construct a function vm(i)[K] that takes choice proles for members of
K and a choice for m(i), and maps it into a payo for player m(i). When we do so, we will assume
that players in Kc (if there are any) play according to the equilibrium prole. For instance, if
I = J = 3 and i = 1, then we can have K be either ;, f2g, f3g, or f2;3g. Consider the case of
K = f2g. We will have vm(1)[f2g] : C1  C2 ! R, so that we are computing expected payos for
m(1) when types for player 2 are in T
2nh2(T2) and types for player 3 are in h3(T3). Because (for
this subset K) types for player 2 are in T
2nh2(T2), vm(1)[f2g] maps a choice for player m(1) plus
choices players in T
2nh2(T2), i.e., C1  C2, into a payo. Because (for this subset K) types for
player 3 are in h3(T3), we assume they play according to the given equilibrium.
Once we have the functions vm(i)[K] for all subsets K  f1;:::;Jgnfig, we can extend these
functions to a function um(i) : C ! R. Specically, set um(i) =
P
KJ[vm(i)[K]  proj CiCK],
where we write proj CiCK : C ! Ci  CK for the projection map. The functions um(i) are the
payo functions for the game G.
Now, let's specify the functions vm(i)[K]. To do so, it will be useful to recall that, for each
j = 1;:::;jIj, hj : Tj ! T
j is injective and bimeasurable. As such, we can dene a bimeasurable
map gj : hj(Tj) ! Tj so that gj(hj(tj)) = tj. Now, x a K  f1;:::;Jgnfig. Let vm(i)[K] :
Ci  CK ! R be such that
vm(i)[K](ci;  ! c K) =
Z

Q
j2K(T
j nhj(Tj))hKc(TKc)
i(;ci;  ! c K(t
K);sKc(gKc(t
Kc)))d
i (m(i)).
(Note, if K = ;, then we take the convention that  
Q
j2K(T
j nhj(Tj))  hKc(TKc) =  
hKc(TKc) so that vm(i)[K] reduces to a mapping from Ci to R. If Kc = ;, then we take the
convention that  
Q
j2K(T
j nhj(Tj))  hKc(TKc) =  
Q
j2K(T
j nhj(Tj)), so that vm(i)[K]
reduces with sKc(gKc(t
Kc)) no longer being a factor.)
We begin by showing that each vm(i)[K] is continuous. For this, we will need a mathematical
result.
Lemma D.1. Fix metrizable spaces 
1;
2. Let  2 (
2) and f : 
1  
2 ! R be a bounded
function so that each f(!1;) : 
2 ! R is -measurable and each f(;!2) : 
1 ! R is continuous.
Dene F : 
1 ! R so that
F(!1) =
Z
E2
f(!1;!2)d,
where E2 2 B(
2). Then, F is a bounded continuous function.
35Proof. The fact that F is bounded follows directly from the fact that f is bounded and (E2)  1.
We focus on showing that F is continuous. For this, x a sequence (!n
1 : n = 1;2;:::) contained in

1 and suppose !n
1 ! !
1. To show that F is continuous, it suces to show that F(!n
1) ! F(!
1).
Write f() : 
2 ! R for the !
1-section of the map f. Also, for each n, write fn() : 
2 ! R
for the !n
1-section of the map f. By assumption, each of f;f1;f2;::: is -measurable. Moreover,
since f is bounded, f is bounded and the sequence (fn : n = 1;2;:::) is uniformly bounded.
Given this, it suces to show that pointwise fn ! f (that is, fn(!2) ! f(!2), for all !2 2 
2
) If so, then, by the Dominated Convergence Theorem, F(!n
1) ! F(!
1). (See Aliprantis and
Border, 2007, page 407.)
To show that fn ! f: Note that !n
1 ! !
1. It follows from the fact that each f(;!2) is
continuous that fn ! f.
Lemma D.2. For each m(i) 2 T
i nhi(Ti) and each K  f1;:::;Jgnfig, vm(i)[K] : Ci  CK ! R
is continuous.
Proof. Dene a mapping fi[K] : Ci  CK   
Q
j2K(T
j nhj(Tj))  hKc(TKc) ! R so that
fi[K](ci;  ! c K;;t
K;t
KC) = i(;ci;  ! c K(t
K);sKc(gKc(t
Kc))).
Certainly, then, fi[K] is bounded. We will show that each fi[K](ci;  ! c K;) is universally measur-
able and each fi[K](;;t
K;t
KC) is continuous. Then the result follows from Lemma D.1 and the
fact that
vm(i)[K](ci;  ! c K) =
Z
(
Q
j2K(T
j nhj(Tj)))hKc(TKc)
fi[K](ci;  ! c K;;t
K;t
KC)d
i (m(i)).
First we show that, for each (ci;  ! c K), fi[K](ci;  ! c K;) is universally measurable: Write
Fi[ci;  ! c K] :  
Y
j2K
(T
j nhj(Tj))  hKc(TKc) !   fcig  CK 
Y
j2KC
(Cj)
for the mapping (;t
K;t
Kc) 7! (;ci;  ! c K(t
K);sKc(gKc(t
Kc))). To show that fi[K](ci;  ! c K;)
is universally measurable, it suces to show that Fi[ci;  ! c K] is universally measurable: Then
fi[K](ci;  ! c K;) = i  Fi[ci;  ! c K] is the composite of universally measurable maps and so univer-
sally measurable.
To see that Fi[ci;  ! c K] is universally measurable: Applying Lemma A.1 and the fact that
each sj is universally measurable, sKc is universally measurable. So, the restriction of sKc to
the domain hKc(TKc) is universally measurable. Now, note that Fi[ci;  ! c K] is the product of
universally measurable maps, each of which has a separable metrizable domain. So, again applying
Lemma A.1, Fi[ci;  ! c K] is universally measurable.
Next we show that, for each (;t
K;t
KC), fi[K](;;t
K;t
KC) is continuous: For this, suppose
that (cn
i ;  ! c n
K) ! (ci;  ! c K). Then, note that (;cn
i ;  ! c n
K(t
K);sKc(gKc(t
Kc))) ! (;ci;  ! c K(t
K);sKc(gKc(t
Kc))).
36So, using the continuity of i, fi[K](cn
i ;  ! c n
K;;t
K;t
KC) ! fi[K](ci;  ! c K;;t
K;t
KC), as required.
Note, the proof of Lemma D.2 explicitly uses the fact that each si is universally measurable.
We do not know if it would attain, if we instead assumed that each i[ci;s i] is universally
measurable.
Lemma D.3. The map um(i) is continuous.
Proof. Note, each proj CiCK is a continuous function. With this and Lemma D.2, each vm(i)[K]
proj CiCK is a continuous function. It follows that um(i) is a nite sum of continuous functions
and so continuous.
Write Di for the set [(Ci)]M(i) write   !  i for an arbitrary element of Di. Take D =
QJ
i=1 Di
and write   !  = (  !  1;:::;  !  j) for an arbitrary element of D. For a given player m(i), take D m(i)
to be [(Ci)](M(i) 1) 
Q
j6=i Dj if M(i) is nite and D otherwise. Note, if M(i) is (countably)
innite D m(i) = D. An arbitrary element of D m(i) will be denoted as   !   m(i).
Extend payo functions to um(i) : D ! R in the usual way. Note, the extended functions
remain continuous. (Use, e.g., Fristedt and Gray, 1996, Theorem 20, Chapter 18 and the denition
of weak convergence.)
Lemma D.4. There exists some mixed choice equilibrium for the game G.
Proof. For each player m(i), dene a best response correspondence BR m(i) : D m(i)  (Ci) so
that
BR m(i)(  !   m(i)) = fm(i) 2 argmaxum(i)(;  !   m(i))g.
Extend this correspondence to a best response correspondence BR m(i) : D  D so that
BR m(i)(m(i);  !   m(i)) = BR m(i)(  !   m(i))  D m(i).
Dene BR : D  D so that BR(  !  ) =
TJ
i=1
TM(i)
m(i)=1 BR m(i)(  !  ). To show that there is a mixed
strategy equilibrium of the game G, it suces to show that there is a xed point of BR.
To show that there is a xed point of BR, we will apply the Glicksberg's (1952) Theorem.
For this, it suces to show that D is a non-empty, compact, convex subset of a convex Hausdor
linear topological space and that BR has a closed graph and is non-empty convex valued.
Note that each (Ci) is a non-empty, compact, convex subset of a convex Hausdor linear
topological space. It follows that D satises the desired conditions. As such, we focus on the
properties of BR.
First, we show that BR has a closed graph: By Berge's Maximum Theorem (see 17.31 in
Aliprantis and Border, 2007), for each m(i), BR m(i) is compact valued and upper-hemicontinuous.
It follows that BR m(i) is a compact valued and upper-hemicontinuous correspondence to a Haus-
dor space. So, applying Theorem 17.10 in Aliprantis and Border (2007), it follows that BR m(i)
37has a closed graph. It now follows from Theorem 17.25 in Aliprantis and Border (2007) that BR
has a closed graph.
Next we show that BR is non-empty convex valued: By Berge's Maximum Theorem (see
17.31 in Aliprantis and Border, 2007), for each m(i), BR m(i) is non-empty valued. It is standard
that BR m(i) is convex valued. (This follows from the fact that payos are linear in mixtures of
probabilities of choices.) It follows from construction then that BR m(i) and BR are non-empty
valued.
In what follows, we x strategies r
i of ( ;T ) satisfying r
i  hi = si. Note, such strategies
are well dened since hi is injective. If T
i nhi(Ti) 6= ;, then given some r
i we write   ! r 
i for
(r
i(1);r
i(2);:::), i.e., the associated element of Di played by types in T
i nhi(Ti) under r
i. A
standard argument establishes the next remark.
Remark D.1. Fix some m(i) 2 T
i nhi(Ti). For any (r
1;:::;r
jIj) with (r
1  h1;:::;r
jIj  hjIj) =
(s1;:::;sjIj), Z
T
 i

i[r
i(m(i));r
 i]d
i (m(i)) = um(i)(  ! r 
1;:::;  ! r 
j):
Conversely, given some (  !  1;:::;  !  j) 2 D, there is a unique strategy prole (r
1;:::;r
jIj) with
(  ! r 
1;:::;  ! r 
j) = (  !  1;:::;  !  j) and (r
1  h1;:::;r
jIj  hjIj) = (s1;:::;sjIj). In this case,
Z
T
 i

i[r
i(m(i));r
 i]d
i (m(i)) = um(i)(  !  1;:::;  !  j):
Lemma D.5. Let 
;
 be Polish. If f : 
 ! 
 is an embedding, then f maps sets in BUM(
)
to sets in BUM(
).
Proof. Fix some E 2 BUM(
) and some  2 (
). We will show that f(E) is -measurable.
Note that f(
) 2 B(
), since f is an embedding. Thus, if (f(
)) = 0, then ;  f(E) 
f(
) with (;) = (f(
)) = 0, i.e., f(E) 2 B(
;). As such, we focus on the case where
(f(
)) > 0.
Dene (G) =
(f(G))
(f(
)), for each G 2 B(
). (Since f is bimeasurable, this is well-dened.)
Using the fact that f is injective, this denes a probability measure  2 (
). Given that E 2
BUM(
), there exist X;Y 2 B(
) so that X  E  Y and (X) = (Y ). Since f is bimeasurable,
f(X);f(Y ) 2 B(
). By construction, f(X)  f(E)  f(Y ) with (f(X)) = (f(Y )), as
required.
Proof of Proposition 5.1. Fix a universally measurable equilibrium (s1;:::;sjIj) of the
Bayesian game ( ;T ). As above, construct the game G (based on (s1;:::;sjIj)). By Lemma
D.4, there exists a mixed choice prole, viz. (  !  1;:::;  !  j), that is an equilibrium for the game
G. Now, by Remark D.1, we can nd a strategy prole (s
1;:::;s
jIj) so that (  ! s 
1;:::;  ! s 
j) =
(  !  1;:::;  !  j) and (s
1  h1;:::;s
jIj  hjIj) = (s1;:::;sjIj). We will show that (s
1;:::;s
jIj) is a
universally equilibrium for the Bayesian game ( ;T ).
38First we show that each s
i is universally measurable. Fix a Borel Ei in (Ci) and note that
(s
i) 1(Ei) = hi((si) 1(Ei)) [ ft
i 2 T
i nhi(Ti) : s
i(t
i) 2 Eig.
Note, since si is universally measurable, (si) 1(Ei) is a universally measurable set and, so, using
the fact that hi is an embedding and Lemma D.5, hi((si) 1(Ei)) is a universally measurable set.
Next, notice that T
i nhi(Ti) is countable (and possibly empty); so ft
i 2 T
i nhi(Ti) : s
i(t
i) 2 Eig is
Borel. It follows that (s
i) 1(Ei) is the union of two universally measurable sets and so universally
measurable.
Now we show Condition (ii) of Denition 2.3: First, x some type hi(ti) 2 hi(Ti). Notice that,
for each ci 2 Ci,
Z
T
 i
i(;s
i(hi(ti));s
 i(t
 i))d
i (hi(ti)) =
Z
T i
i(;s
i(hi(ti));s
 i(h i(t i)))di(ti)

Z
T i
i(;ci;s
 i(h i(t i)))di(ti)
=
Z
T
 i
i(;ci;s
 i(t
 i))d
i (hi(ti));
where the rst and last lines use the Change of Variables Theorem (e.g., Billingsley (2008, Theorem
16.13) plus the fact that h i is injective, and the second line uses the fact that the fact that
(s1;:::;sjIj) = (s
1  h1;:::;s
jIj  hjIj) is an equilibrium for the Bayesian game ( ;T ).
Next, x some type t
i 2 T
i nhi(Ti), if one exists. Here, Condition (ii) follows from Remark
D.1 and the fact that (  !  1;:::;  !  i) is an equilibrium of the constructed strategic form game G.
Thus, we have that (s
1;:::;s
jIj) is a universally measurable Bayesian equilibrium of ( ;T ).
Moreover, (s
1  h1;:::;s
jIj  hjIj) = (s1;:::;sjIj), as required.
Appendix E Proofs for Section 5.2
For the purpose of this Appendix, we will need to extend the notion of a type structure. Call T =
(;(Ci;i)i2I) a -based separable metrizable type structure if is satises the conditions
of Denition 2.1, with the exception that each Ti may only be a separable metrizable set. The
denitions in Sections 2-3 apply by replacing a -based type structure with a -based separable
metrizable type structure.
Lemma E.1. Fix a -based type structure T = (;(Ti;i)i2I). Let
QjIj
i=1 Ti be a belief-closed
subset of T. Then, there is a -based separable metrizable type structure
T = (;(Ti;i)i2I);
where, for each ti 2 Ti and each event E i in   T i, i(ti)(E i) = i(ti)(E i).
39Proof. Since we endow each Ti with the relative topology, we have that each Ti is separable
metrizable. Also note that i(ti) is indeed a probability measure on   T i. To see this, recall
that
QjIj
i=1 Ti is a belief-closed subset of T, so that each T i is Borel in T i with i(ti)(T i) = 1.
So, if E i is an event in   T i, it is also an event in   T i and i(ti) forms a probability
measure.
Finally, we show that each i is measurable. Fix some F Borel in (  T i). Dene
H  (T i) so that  2 H if and only if there exists some  2 F so that (E i) = (E i) for
each event E i in   T i. It follows from Lemma 14.4 in Aliprantis and Border (2007) that H
is Borel in (  T i). It is immediate from the construction that (i) 1(F) = (i) 1(H) \ Ti.
So, using the fact that i is measurable, (i) 1(F) is measurable, as required.
Take the -based type structure T = (;(Ti;i)i2I) and the constructed separable metrizable
structure, viz. T = (;(Ti;i)i2I), from Lemma E.1. Write (id i : Ti ! Ti) for the identity map.
Then, T can be embedded into T via (id 1;:::;id jIj).
Lemma E.2. Fix a -based Bayesian games ( ;T ) and ( ;T ) where
(i) T = (;(Ti;i)i2I) is a separable metrizable type structure and
(ii) T can be embedded in T  = (;(T
i ;
i )i2I) via (h1;:::;hjIj).
Let (s1;:::;sjIj) (resp. (s
1;:::;s
jIj) ) be a strategy prole of ( ;T ) (resp. ( ;T )) so that si =
s
i  hi for each i. If i[ci;s i] is i(ti)-measurable, then 
i[ci;s
 i] is 
i (hi(ti)) measurable.
Proof. Fix some hi(ti) 2 hi(Ti)  T
i . Fix also some ci 2 Ci and some Borel E  R. We will
show that (
i[ci;s
 i]) 1(E) 2 B(  T
 i;
i (hi(ti))).
By assumption, (i[ci;s i]) 1(E) is in B(  T i;i(ti)). That is, there exists F i;G i 2
B(  T i) so that
F i  (i[ci;s i]) 1(E)  G i
and i(ti)(F i) = i(ti)(G i). Since (id h i) is bimeasurable, (id h i)(F i);(id h i)(G i) 2
B(  T
 i). Moreover,
(id  h i)(F i)  (id  h i)((i[ci;s i]) 1(E))  (id  h i)(G i)
and, using the fact that (id  h i) is injective,

i (hi(ti))((id  h i)(F i)) = i(ti)(F i) = i(ti)(G i) = 
i (hi(ti))((id  h i)(G i)):
Now notice that
(id  h i)((i[ci;s i]) 1(E)) = (
i[ci;s
 i]) 1(E) \ (  h i(T i)):
This allows us to conclude that (
i[ci;s
 i]) 1(E) \ (  h i(T i)) is 
i (hi(ti)) measurable.
40Since (
i[ci;s
 i]) 1(E) \ (  h i(T i)) is 
i (hi(ti)) measurable, there exists F
 i;G
 i in
B(  T
 i) with
F
 i  (
i[ci;s
 i]) 1(E) \ (  h i(T i))  G
 i
and 
i (hi(ti))(F
 i) = 
i (hi(ti))(G
 i). Take H
 i =   (T
 inh i(T i))). Since (id  h i) is
bimeasurable, G
 i [ H
 i is Borel. Thus,
F
 i  (
i[ci;s
 i]) 1(E)  G
 i [ H
 i:
Moreover, since H
 i is 
i (hi(ti))-null, 
i (hi(ti))(F
 i) = 
i (hi(ti))(G
 i [ H
 i).
Proof of Lemma 5.3. Suppose T induces a decomposition of T  via (h1;:::;hjIj). Then, both
Q
i2I hi(Ti) and
Q
i2I(T
i nhi(Ti)) are belief-closed subsets of T. So, using Lemma E.1, each of
these induce a -based separable metrizable type structure. Write
T (h1;:::;hjIj) = (;(hi(Ti);i)i2I)
for the structure induced by T , and write
(T nT ) = (;(T
i nhi(Ti);
O
i )i2I)
for the dierence structure.
Fix a -based game   and an equilibrium (s1;:::;sjIj) for the Bayesian Game ( ;T ). Suppose
there exists an equilibrium for the dierence game ( ;(T nT )), viz. (sO
1;:::;sO
jIj). Construct a
strategy, viz. s
i, for ( ;T ), as follows. For each ti 2 Ti, let s
i(hi(ti)) = si(ti). (This is well-
dened since each hi is injective.) For each t
i 2 T
i nhi(Ti), let s
i(t
i) = sO
i (t
i). We now show that
the constructed (s
1;:::;s
jIj) is a Bayesian equilibrium for ( ;T ).
Condition (i) follows from Lemma E.2. Thus we focus on Condition (ii).
First, x a type hi(ti) 2 hi(Ti). For an action ci 2 Ci, the Change of Variables Theorem (e.g.,
Billingsley, 2008, Theorem 16.13) gives that
Z
T
 i
i(;ci;s
 i(t
 i))d
i (hi(ti)) =
Z
T i
i(;ci;s i(t i))di(ti).
So, using the fact that (s1;:::;sjIj) is a Bayesian Equilibrium of ( ;T ),
Z
T
 i
i(;s
i(hi(ti));s
 i(t
 i))d
i (hi(ti)) 
Z
T
 i
i(;ci;s
 i(t
 i))d
i (hi(ti)), (1)
for all ci.
41Likewise, given a type t
i 2 T
i nhi(Ti) and a choice ci 2 Ci,
Z
T
 i
i(;ci;s
 i(t
 i))d
i (t
i) =
Z

Q
j6=i T
j nhj(Tj)
i(;ci;sO
 i(t
 i))dO
i (t
i).
So, using the fact that (sO
1;:::;sO
jIj) is a Bayesian Equilibrium of ( ;T nT ),
Z
T
 i
i(;s
i(t
i);s
 i(t
 i))d
i (t
i) 
Z
T
 i
i(;ci;s
 i(t
 i))d
i (t
i), (2)
for all strategies ci.
Taking Equations 1-2, (s
1;:::;s
jIj) is an equilibrium for the Bayesian game ( ;T ). The
converse follows immediately from the Pull-Back Property (Proposition 3.1).
Proof of Proposition 5.2. If hT ;T i satises the Extension Property for  , then it is
immediate that there is an equilibrium for the Bayesian game ( ;T ). Conversely, suppose there
is an equilibrium for the Bayesian game ( ;T ). By the Pull-Back Property (Proposition 3.1),
there is an equilibrium for the dierence game ( ;(T nT )). Now, using Lemma 5.3, hT ;T i
satises the Equilibrium Extension Property for  .
Proof of Lemma 5.4. Now, let  be a common prior for T . Fix distinct players i and j and
note that
i(ti)(  ftjg  T i j) =
(  ftig  ftjg  T i j)
(  ftig  T i j)
:
So, i(ti)(ftjgT i j) > 0 if and only if (ftigftjgT i j) > 0. But, an analogous
argument for j gives that j(tj)(ftigT i j) > 0 if and only if (ftigftjgT i j) > 0.
This establishes the result.
Proof of Lemma 5.5. By Lemma 5.2, there exists some i with T
i nhi(Ti) non-empty. In
particular, x t
i 2 T
i nhi(Ti). Recall, since T  is mutually absolutely continuous, it is countable.
As such, for each player j 6= i, we can nd some t
j 2 T
j with 
i (t
i)(  ft
jg  T
 i j) > 0.
Again using the fact that T  is mutually absolutely continuous, we also have that, for each such
t
j, 
j(t
j)(  ft
ig  T
 i j) > 0. This implies that t
j 2 T
j nhj(Tj). (If t
j 2 hj(Tj), then
there is some tj 2 Tj with j(tj)(  (hi) 1(ft
ig)  T i j) > 0, contradicting the fact that
(hi) 1(ft
ig) = ;.)
Now, note that, since each hj is bimeasurable, each T
j nhj(Tj) is Borel. So, for each j,
42
i (t
i)(  (T
j nhj(Tj))  T
 i j) = 1. Since this holds for each j 6= i, we have
1 = 
i (t
i)(  \j6=i((T
j nhj(Tj))  T
 i j))
= 
i (t
i)( 
Y
j6=i
(T
j nhj(Tj))),
as required.
Finally, note that we showed that, for each j 6= i, T
j nhj(Tj) is non-empty. So, applying the
same argument to each t
j 2 T
j nhj(Tj), we get the desired result.
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